In the face of relentless Russian onslaughts, Ukraine must secure its future and that of Western rules-based order now. The decision made in 1994 to relinquish its nuclear arsenal, under the Budapest Memorandum, was predicated on assurances of territorial integrity and political sovereignty from the world’s leading powers. However, the harsh realities of the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022 have starkly illuminated the insufficiency of those assurances.
As the geopolitical landscape and the front line continues to shift, Ukraine must reevaluate its defense strategy and the West – its core principles.
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It is becoming increasingly evident that the path forward is not a choice between nuclear deterrence and NATO membership for Ukraine, but rather a combination of both – ‘Nukes and NATO.’
For Russia, the method of delivering a nuclear strike against Ukraine does not necessitate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could trigger a global nuclear war. Instead, Russia could employ aircraft, short-range missiles, or even tactical missiles, all methods that the international community has, regrettably, become accustomed to in regional conflicts.
This means that Moscow might calculate the risks of using nuclear weapons against Ukraine as acceptable, especially given their capability to carry out such strikes without crossing the thresholds that would compel a total war response from other nuclear powers.
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Ukraine, on the other hand, lacks the long-range missile capabilities necessary to pose a viable threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear triad. The absence of intercontinental delivery systems means that even if Ukraine were to re-establish its nuclear arsenal, and even if it was in a matter of weeks, it would not be able to knock out Russia’s nuclear forces.
This imbalance puts Ukraine at a significant disadvantage, as its potential nuclear deterrent would be limited to shorter-range threats that Russia might deem manageable within its broader strategic calculations.
The idea of sacrificing cities like Smolensk or even Moscow in response to a Ukrainian strike might seem unthinkable.
However, under Vladimir Putin’s regime, such losses could be considered an acceptable risk. The Russian population has been subjected to intense state propaganda, fostering a nationalistic fervor that could be manipulated to justify extreme measures.
Russians have been conditioned to perceive external threats as existential, and Putin could leverage this mindset to maintain public support even in the face of significant casualties.
A nuclear-armed Ukraine might still face the prospect of overwhelming destruction from Russia. Reinstating its nuclear program could provide Moscow with a pretext for escalation, potentially leading to a pre-emptive strike aimed at neutralizing Ukraine’s nascent capabilities.
This scenario could result in catastrophic consequences for Ukraine, further aggravated by its attempts to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Paradoxically, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities could make Ukraine more vulnerable rather than more secure, in the short term.
Moreover, history has shown that violations of international norms by Russia do not always elicit the expected responses from the global community.
Russian drones have repeatedly violated NATO airspace, and incidents have resulted in the deaths of citizens in member countries like Poland. Yet, these provocations have not triggered a proportionate response from the West, and even led to quick attempts to deescalate, which highlights NATO’s hesitancy to confront Russia directly.
This pattern suggests that even a nuclear attack on Ukraine might not galvanize decisive action from NATO or its member states. The West’s reluctance to engage in direct confrontation with Russia indicates a possible cowering in fear rather than a robust defense of international law and agreements.
Given these realities, Ukraine cannot afford to view its security options as a binary choice between nuclear armament and NATO membership.
The evolving geopolitical landscape and the ever-changing front line necessitates a strategy of ‘Nukes and NATO.’ This dual approach could provide the immediate deterrence that nuclear capabilities offer while also securing the long-term collective defense benefits of alliance membership. It recognizes that reliance on international assurances alone is insufficient and that Ukraine must take proactive steps to ensure its survival.
This situation raises critical questions about NATO’s reluctance to admit Ukraine. Is the alliance hesitant due to Russian pressure and influence within its own ranks? Does Russia have too much sway over NATO’s internal operations, effectively vetoing Ukraine’s membership? Alternatively, are Western nations fearful that Ukraine, especially if it becomes nuclear-armed, might hold disproportionate sway within NATO? As the only country directly confronting Russian aggression, a nuclear Ukraine could potentially overshadow current NATO members who do not possess nuclear weapons, thereby shifting the internal balance of power within the alliance.
Taras Kuzio, a renowned expert on Ukrainian affairs, has highlighted the repetitive and often vacuous nature of NATO’s statements over the years regarding Ukraine’s membership aspirations. From the 2008 Bucharest Summit’s declaration that “these countries will become members of NATO” to the 2023 Vilnius Summit’s assertion that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” and beyond, the alliance has repeatedly affirmed support without taking concrete steps. Kuzio emphasizes that these statements, especially during times of Russian aggression, lack the actionable commitments Ukraine desperately needs.
Ukraine has been on the front lines of defending not just its own sovereignty but also the democratic values that NATO purports to uphold. The alliance’s indecision not only undermines Ukraine’s security but also calls into question NATO’s commitment to its foundational principles. If NATO cannot support a nation that is actively resisting the very threat the alliance was created to deter, it risks eroding its credibility and effectiveness on the global stage.
Considering NATO’s shortcomings, Ukraine must contemplate a security strategy that includes both nuclear deterrence and alliance membership. This approach would not only serve as a deterrent against Russian aggression but also compel NATO to confront the realities of the security environment in Eastern Europe. It would force the alliance to reevaluate its policies and perhaps accelerate Ukraine’s integration.
Furthermore, the pursuit of ‘Nukes and NATO’ could serve as a catalyst for NATO to strengthen its collective defense posture.
If NATO is concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially among its potential members, it should provide the security guarantees that make such proliferation unnecessary. By offering Ukraine a clear and expedited path to membership, NATO could dissuade Ukraine from pursuing nuclear capabilities independently.
This strategy also addresses the potential issue of Ukraine’s influence within NATO. The fear that a nuclear-armed Ukraine might overshadow other members could be mitigated by integrating Ukraine’s capabilities into the collective defense framework. This would enhance the alliance’s overall strength without disproportionately elevating any single member’s influence.
The current state of affairs begs the question: Is NATO’s hesitance rooted in fear of Russia or in apprehension about Ukraine’s potential impact within the alliance? If the former, it signals that Russia wields undue influence over NATO’s decision-making processes. If the latter, it suggests that NATO is unwilling to fully embrace a member that could significantly contribute to the alliance’s strategic capabilities and deterrence posture.
Recent news of additional military aid to Ukraine from Western allies is a glaring indicator of why Ukraine is forced to restructure the current status quo.
When Australia, with a population of 27 million, is sending 49 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, while the US, with a population of 346 million, has sent just 31 Abrams tanks, Ukraine’s pursuit of ‘Nukes or NATO’ is not an act of aggressive negotiations but a rational response to the existential threats it faces.
It is a call for the international community to recognize that half-measures and delayed commitments are no longer sufficient. The choices made today will have lasting implications for the security architecture of Europe and the integrity of international alliances designed to preserve peace.
The only shortfall of the Ukrainian approach is its “either, or” stance. A dual approach of developing nuclear capabilities while pursuing NATO membership addresses both immediate and long-term security concerns.
It would challenge NATO to reaffirm its commitment to collective defense and to support a nation that embodies the very principles the alliance was founded upon. Failure to adapt to these new realities may not only jeopardize Ukraine’s future but could also undermine the global perception of NATO’s strength and resolve.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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