While US President Elect Donald Trump claims that his administration will end the Russia-Ukraine war in short order, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s hope that India can influence Russia and reduce its capacity to wage war against Ukraine by stopping its huge purchases of cheap Russian oil is either a case of wishful thinking or diplomatic rhetoric.
Zelensky has qualified that hope by voicing displeasure and disappointment with India’s abstention from UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, asserting that India cannot be neutral between aggressor and victim. Apparently, he realizes that his hope is at odds with India’s national interest because India intends to continue buying large quantities of Russian oil which he says have helped Russia to shore up its war economy.
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Since Russia mounted its illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India has established itself as one of Russia’s two largest oil buyers and has much to gain from keeping on good terms with Russia.
India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar explained on Aug. 17, 2022 that in a country with a GDP of $2,000 per capita (the latest World Bank figure is $2,485) people could not afford higher energy prices. “It is my obligation… my moral duty to ensure that I get them the best deal I can,” he said.
The significant reality is that India has not bought Russian crude on the cheap. India paid $80 per barrel, about 30 percent more than the G7’s price cap, in 2023. It has paid Russia for oil in US dollars, UAE dirham and, reluctantly, even in yuan, the currency of China, its Asian archrival and territorial challenger. Last July, India overtook China as Russia’s largest oil customer.
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The reason? The Russia-India tie is mutually advantageous. Russia has been India’s largest arms retailer for more than half a century. But China is Russia’s top strategic and economic priority.
During his official trip to Russia last July, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed Russia as India’s “all weather friend” and “trusted ally.” The unanswered question is when and how Russia became such a close partner, especially when New Delhi often evokes its strategic autonomy and subscribes to the rules-based order, which is an American construct.
Add to that Moscow’s recent threats of nuclear strikes on any country helping Ukraine – and many in India and the West might wonder why ‘strategically autonomous’ New Delhi praised a warmongering Russia as an ally, which entails binding commitments. The biggest surprise was that India joined Russia in referring to the conflict “around Ukraine” – rather than in Ukraine – in the statement issued after the Modi-Putin meeting.
Like China, India has continually abstained from condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, while insisting that it is not neutral but on the side of peace (a phrase also used often by China). During his official visit to Kyiv in August, Modi told Zelensky that India supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity. But in June, India rejected the plan presented by Zelensky at his Swiss peace summit, which called for the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Zelensky asked several countries, including India, to host a second peace summit, with a caveat: Ukraine would not hold a peace summit in a country that had not signed its Swiss communique. And he is clear that neutrality means “that you’re with Russia.” That implies that despite his respect for a large country like India and its prime minister, Zelensky doesn’t entertain high expectations for Indian peacemaking between Russia and Ukraine.
Zelensky’s skepticism is realistic. As president of the G20 in 2023, India staged a diplomatic coup by preventing the group from condemning Russia in its final declaration. The US and its European allies accepted India’s stance and signed the declaration. India’s position was a contrast to that of Indonesia as president of the G20 in 2022, when its statement in Jakarta lambasted, ‘in strongest terms’, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
Moreover, while claiming to be a global peace facilitator, India has yet to present a peace plan to end the war in Ukraine. New Delhi insists that Russia and Ukraine “will have to negotiate” but cannot prevail upon them to do that.
Meanwhile, India, like China, is giving Russia critical dual technology, which can be used for civilian and military purposes. Recently, the Financial Times and Bloomberg reported that the components sent by India to Russia include parts for telecommunications and other electronic goods, making them subject to Western export controls.
Dual technology exports by India to Russia have angered the US, EU and Japan. Last November, the Bengaluru-based Si2 Microsystems came under the sanctions scanner for its alleged role in supplying dual-use technology to Moscow. Innovio Ventures also features in reports as the supplier of at least $4.9 million worth of electronic goods, including drones, to Russia. The US has imposed sanctions on more than 19 Indian companies for sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine. New Delhi has responded that the Indian entities did not violate domestic laws but that it would “sensitize Indian companies to applicable export control provisions.”
At the very least, Putin will only agree to negotiate if Ukraine makes significant territorial concessions to Russia. That makes India’s talk of supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the UN Charter meaningless, especially since post-Soviet Russia itself recognized Ukraine’s statehood in 1991, but is now intent on making a land grab. Dependent on Russia for military and oil supplies, New Delhi lacks real clout over Moscow. Given Russia’s longstanding plan to extinguish Ukraine, any Indian help in peacemaking remains on an infinite horizon.
Anita Inder Singh is a Founding Professor of the Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi and has been a Fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies in Washington, DC. She has taught international relations at the graduate level at Oxford and the London School of Economics and is currently writing a book on the US and Asia. She has also published widely (in nine countries) on nationalism and the International Relations of Europe and Asia. More of her work may be viewed at www.anitaindersingh.com
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
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