Don’t look now but Russian President Vladimir Putin’s would-be global empire is getting smaller by the month. And 2025 is likely to be even more perilous for the dictator and Russian prestige around the world.
Since the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the hollowed-out remains of the Russian military are struggling to project influence throughout the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel region of West Africa, and Sudan.
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The resulting strategic losses of the Russian naval facility in Tartus, on the Mediterranean coast, and Khmeimim Air Base located southeast of the city of Latakia are severely disrupting Moscow’s logistics and military supply chain to Africa.
Once used to keep the al-Assad regime in power, their loss is proving to be a major embarrassment to Russian prestige.
So, too, the sanctuary once afforded by al-Assad to conduct planning, training, transit of weapons and ammunition from Iran and Russia has now been denied now by the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Other key Russian allies in the Mideast are taking hits too. Iran and its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies are being systematically decimated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran has proven to be no match to Israel’s intelligence community including Aman (military), Mossad (overseas) and Shin Bet (internal security).
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Nor to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
Intended by the Kremlin to sow conflict and instability throughout the Middle East, Iran and its hapless proxies have now become a liability to Putin’s machinations to recreate a Peter the Great-like Russian empire.
All of this is the result of Putin’s ill-fated decision to support what was an IRGC-directed terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. That decision runs second only to Putin’s decision to launch a “special military operation” into Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.
Yet Putin’s walls, as John Cougar Mellencamp once sang, are “tumblin’ down” elsewhere in his would-be empire as well.
Alongside Africa and the Middle East, Russian influence is also rapidly failing in the Black Sea region – and most significantly amongst members of the Kremlin-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
The latest examples of Putin’s waning influence came from Sudan and Libya last week. According to a report in The Moscow Times on Dec. 18, Sudan rejected a Russian request to construct a naval base on the Red Sea coast in Port Sudan. That was followed by Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s announcement that he would “resist any efforts by Russia to strengthen its military presence in the country.”
As Russia pulls its forces and equipment out of Syria, the Kremlin has nowhere to reposition them in the Mediterranean or Red Sea. To compound Moscow’s growing problem, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that the Russian-flagged Ursa Major sank south of Spain after a blast occurred in its engine room.
The ship is the flagship vessel owned by Oboronlogistika, “a shipping company that moves cargo for Russia’s Defense Ministry.” According to the Ukrainian military’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), the vessel was sailing to Syria to move Russian weapons and equipment out of the country.
But with one slight turn of the kaleidoscope in Russia – as we have witnessed in the Middle East – change can occur, quickly.
Putin’s empire is also beginning to implode from within. Earlier this month we noted that during Putin’s visit to Astana, Kazakhstan to attend the CSTO summit, he referred to Kazakhstan as a “Russian-speaking country.”
But when Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the summit audience, he did so in his native Kazakh. Anton Gerashchenko, a former key counselor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, characterized the clash as “trolling at a prohibitive level.”
Kazakhstan is the second CSTO country to publicly snub Russia. In July, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia plans to withdraw from the treaty.
Eastern Europe is arguably setting up to be the European Union (EU) Winner of 2025. Much to the chagrin of Moscow, Moldova is firmly on the pathway for admission into the EU.
But with one slight turn of the kaleidoscope in Russia – as we have witnessed in the Middle East – change can occur, quickly.
Russian-backed governments of Serbia and Georgia could be next. Belgrade was awarded EU candidate status in 2012; Tbilisi in 2023.
Russia’s longtime Balkan ally Serbia is feeling the pressure to integrate into the EU as well. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić – who is facing accusations of curbing democratic freedoms rather than advancing them – has accused foreign intelligence services of trying to unseat him in the wake of spreading protests and says he will not flee the country like recently ousted Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad.
Although not related, on Dec. 22 tens of thousands of Serbians assembled in Belgrade’s Slavija Square for a rally against Vučić and his government. The protest was in response to a collapsed canopy at a railway station in the country’s north that killed 15. However, the Vučić-led government is concerned large protests like this one could easily escalate.
Georgian citizens are still incensed over the October election results. Georgia President Salome Zourabichvili maintains the election was stolen as part of a “Russian special operation.” Meanwhile, violent clashes continue in the capital city of Tbilisi between police and protesters infuriated about Georgian Dream Party Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s decision to put talks on joining the EU on hold.
Then there is Belarus. President Alexander Lukashenko is beholden to Putin, who essentially secured his sixth presidential term in 2020. In return, Lukashenko allowed Putin to stage military forces and invade Ukraine from within the borders of Belarus.
Earlier this month, to ensure Lukashenko’s survival from perceived external threats – namely Poland – the Belarusian dictator signed a treaty with Putin providing security guarantees that included the possible use of nuclear weapons to forebode any foreign aggression. Belarus now “hosts dozens of Russian [tactical] nuclear weapons and will prepare facilities for the planned deployment of Moscow’s newest hypersonic ballistic missile [Oreshnik].”
But it is the internal threat that is most likely to unseat Lukashenko. Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, currently living in exile in Lithuania, once described living conditions in Belarus as the equivalent of “living in a Gulag – an atmosphere of tyranny and terror and repression.”
She has been adamant in her pursuit to bring Belarus into the European family of nations: “Belarus’ place in the European family is not just a dream; it’s a destiny that we, as a nation, are committed to achieving. We seek to join the rest of Europe as a full-fledged democracy, embodying the European values of freedom, equality, and fraternity.”
Elections are scheduled in Belarus for Jan. 26 with Lukashenko running for his seventh term in office. Tsikhanouskaya is counting on a strong turnout to unseat the him, and the same level of enthusiasm that brought tens of thousands of protesters out into the streets of Minsk carrying banners mocking the Lukashenko and chanting “Go away!”
Yet free and fair elections in Russian-dominated countries are highly unlikely. Payoffs, ballot box stuffing, arrests, and physical intimidation are the standard. Look no further than recent elections in Moldova, Georgia, and Venezuela.
Belarus will be no exception. The outcome is practically assured, and as Belarusian political analyst Valery Karbalevich stated: “There won’t be mass protests in freezing January.”
But with one slight turn of the kaleidoscope in Russia – as we have witnessed in the Middle East – change can occur, quickly. Momentum can be dangerous. Consider the rapid fall of Romanian Dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu. He and his wife Elena were executed by firing squad 35 years ago on Christmas Day after a summary trial.
Putin best keep Beijing on speed dial. He may soon need to trade his dacha near Moscow for a Siheyuan in China.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
Copyright 2024. Jonathan E. Sweet and Mark C. Toth. All rights reserved.
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