This exclusive interview with Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the former two-term Polish president (1995-2005), covers recent events in Ukraine, Russia and Poland. The ex-president was heavily involved in Ukrainian affairs during his presidency and remains so to this day. The interview covered what went on behind the scenes during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity and whether the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian war could have been avoided.
See Part 1 of the interview here.
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This year Poland celebrated 20 years of EU membership. During your presidency, you led Poland into both the EU and NATO. Ukraine, following the preferences of its citizens, has also chosen a Western vector and has European aspirations, which you have supported from the very beginning. However, there are voices in the West that are not favorable to Ukraine’s accession to these structures. Similar skepticism was also voiced towards Poland during its integration process with the EU. Yet Poland successfully became a member of the European community. What advice do you have for Ukraine in its aspirations for EU membership?
I wouldn’t worry about skeptical voices; such views have existed in the past, exist now, and will continue to exist. They argue that the EU should be limited to the Europe of Charlemagne, which ended in the western territories of present-day Germany and didn’t even include their Prussian part. These are historical associations that carry little weight. Ukraine has a European perspective and should become an EU member state. The practical problems that stand in the way are primarily related to the war. We don’t know how it will end, what will come after, and what shape Ukraine will take. Setting a criterion that Ukraine can join the EU only if it returns to its pre-2014 borders could be very complicated.
Financial Stress Index in Ukraine Lowest Since February 2022
Another issue concerns democratic institutions, which for obvious reasons operate in a wartime mode. They are partially frozen, and some do not exist. This is a problem given that the EU is a democratic body where elections are held, freedom of speech prevails, and political freedom is respected. It’s crucial that Ukraine quickly return to democratic norms after the war. Democracy was present in Ukraine, and most democratic parameters were being met.
The third problem is technical: Ukraine is a large country, and negotiations for EU accession won’t be easy, especially regarding agriculture. The Ukrainian agricultural base is one of the largest in Europe. Ukraine’s accession to the EU will raise concerns in this regard, as we have already seen in Poland and Romania.
The fourth factor is well known. We have often heard that Russia opposes Ukraine’s NATO membership but has no objections to EU membership. We know this isn’t true. In 2013, Yanukovych wanted to sign an association agreement with the EU but didn’t do so due to Russian pressure. This must be reckoned with as negotiations pick up pace, Russia will sabotage them in various ways. It certainly won’t remain indifferent to these matters.
I have no doubt that Ukraine’s place is in the European Union, and it should join sooner rather than later. To be frank, the EU should adopt a different negotiating model with Ukraine than it did with other countries that joined under normal conditions, such as Poland.
So how should the negotiation process proceed then?
I will say something that may draw criticism from some experts – perhaps it’s not worth nitpicking over details, as was the case during the EU enlargement in 2004. Specialists will say that we shouldn’t go down that path – details, rules, and procedures are important because failing to fulfill them could dilute integration and thus affect subsequent membership. This cannot be completely underestimated.
The topic of peace talks is increasingly discussed in the media. Russia refers to the 2022 proposal, which in fact was a staged act of capitulation imposed on Ukraine, not a genuine peace offer. Radosław Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, said at the beginning of 2024 in Davos: “There is never a shortage of pocket Chamberlains willing to sacrifice other people’s land, or freedom for their own peace of mind.” What should actual peace talks look like and what should be the policy associated with them?
This is a very complex issue. Today, two and a half years after the beginning of the invasion, we must first clearly indicate who the aggressor is and who the victim is. If this is blurred, it will turn out that we don’t even know what peace we are talking about. Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim. The possibility of starting any negotiations should begin with the aggressor, Russia, acknowledging that it has achieved the goals of its so-called “Special Military Operation,” fully suspending military actions, calling for the same from Ukraine, and proposing to initiate talks. This wouldn’t be an ideal scenario for Ukraine, but it could save human lives, and perhaps it would be worth approaching such negotiations.
The problem is that Russia will not do this. Currently, any cessation of military actions would be seen by Ukraine as an act of capitulation. It would be an acknowledgment of the aggressor’s superiority and an admission of weakness.
Additionally, presidential elections in the United States are approaching – we don’t know who will win, but a certain picture is emerging. If Trump claims he can bring about peace in one day, let’s be clear – it could only lead to Ukraine’s capitulation. Trump could do this by withholding financial and military aid. The consequences of such a decision would be dire – this aid to Ukraine is crucial. It could lead not only to the maintenance of Russian troops in the already occupied territories but also to the takeover of political influence throughout Ukraine. Ukraine would enter the Russian sphere of influence, Putin would have a sense of triumph and encouragement for further hostile actions against Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. I think this would not be the case with the Baltic states, which are in NATO, but I’m not certain. The Republican Party has many people in its ranks who remember Reagan and his policy towards Russia. They could limit Trump in his actions, which would be beneficial for Ukraine. This comprises many elements, but the key lies with Putin. He wants to take control of all of Ukraine. Until he wants or is forced to start peace negotiations, everything will remain wishful thinking.
Russian policy towards Ukraine and the West is escalatory in nature. In response, the West adopts a de-escalatory approach. Some question whether the West even wants to win this war.
They want to win, but they have a fundamental problem – they don’t know how to do it. So far, Ukrainian heroism, determination, and combat skills have kept Russia at bay. Over these two years, Ukrainians have demonstrated that they are proficient fighters and can effectively utilize new types of weapons. This holding at bay can be likened to a boxing match – it’s closer to a draw than a victory. You cannot win a war without allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia. The aggressor has full freedom to use and deploy its weaponry near the Ukrainian border, while Ukraine’s hands are tied. This poses a fundamental problem – some Western political elites fear provoking Putin into using nuclear weapons and triggering World War III. Ukraine is holding back Russia at a tremendous cost, but it is also gaining world support in the process. The money and weapons provided to Ukraine aren’t insignificant – they represent colossal resources.
What’s the source of fear regarding Russia, escalation and the use of nuclear weapons? Is it a lack of understanding of Russia by Western elites? Ukraine has crossed many of Russia’s red lines, yet nothing has happened.
Russia is not a superpower in economic terms, but it is due to its possession of nuclear weapons. We are talking about a political system, Putinism, which lacks any internal democratic controls. Russian society has in its DNA the gene of imperialism. It is convinced of its power and believes that Russia will not allow itself to be limited in any way.
Support for Putin may not be as high as election results suggest, but it is still significant. There’s no widespread opposition movement in Russia, no demonstrations take place. When we sum all this up, the risk that in such a non-democratic country with strong support for imperial and assertive policies, the leader might decide to blow up the world is not so improbable. I think some of these concerns are justified. Therefore, Ukraine deserves credit for taking up the fight. At the beginning of the invasion, many experts claimed that Kyiv would fall within a week. Today, Ukraine has been defending itself for two and a half years.
Recently, Tusk and Zelensky signed a bilateral security agreement. How do you assess Polish-Ukrainian relations?
I consider them strategically good. I think the new coalition government in Poland understands the need to support Ukraine. Certainly, Poland will not limit the scope and scale of assistance. Secondly, when seriously discussing Ukraine’s accession to the EU, it is high time to start expert-level discussions on the issues that will arise. Agriculture is a topic that could potentially strain future Polish-Ukrainian relations. I vividly remember that when Poland was joining the EU, Polish agriculture raised concerns in the West. Mitigating these concerns in Western countries required significant effort. On the Polish side, solutions had to be found to adapt to the new reality as well. We need to start working on solutions that will enable Ukraine to integrate into the EU agricultural market and labor market. The transport sector, crucial for Ukraine, will also compete with the existing European fabric.
Aleksandr Kwasniewski in Kyiv in May 2024
The third thing concerns what we observe both in Poland and in other Western countries: war fatigue – exhaustion from war, presence of refugees, and many other daily problems fuel political groups like Poland’s Konfederacja. In my opinion, the strong performance of this party in European elections stemmed from anti-Ukrainian narratives. We must reckon with the existence and potential growth of such sentiments, although in my view they are completely unfounded. Ukrainians have made a significant contribution to the Polish economy, evident simply by walking the streets of Warsaw. However, some will capitalize on these sentiments, arguing that refugees increase queues for doctors and take away jobs. This is false and cynical, but it can arise.
On the other hand, I am pleased that historical tensions between Poland and Ukraine are weakening. We live in a new normal and events like the Volhynia Massacre, Operation Vistula, and all other unfortunate incidents are becoming more distant history. This is especially evident when considering the massive wave of assistance for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. Historical factors, even in the case of anti-Ukrainian narratives like those of Konfederacja, won’t be as significant as they were 10 or 20 years ago.
Francis Fukuyama posited the thesis of the end of history, which has aged unfavorably. Societies were caught off guard by the pandemic and subsequently by a major war in Europe. It would be naive to think that the future will be predictable. We treat many things as certainties, including Western structures like NATO and the EU. What lies ahead for us in the future?
Fukuyama’s book is deeper than its title suggests. It is overused to say there is an end of history. Many processes are ongoing in the world, influenced by countless factors. History will continue, but whether it will be for better or worse remains the crucial question. If the West wants to maintain its strength, it must evolve alongside the changing world and respond to the challenges it faces. I believe that politics is not the primary source of these changes; they mainly stem from the technological revolution. The internet alone has transformed the world more significantly than political actions. Soon, artificial intelligence will alter the world again, displacing many jobs currently held by humans. Climate change also plays a role, making some places uninhabitable and affecting migration. Economic processes further complicate matters. Politics comes into play after all these factors.
We must keep our eyes wide open to see how these changes affect us. We cannot believe that the European Union, NATO, or democracy signify the end of history either. All of these will evolve, sometimes even revolutionize. Above all, it’s crucial to ensure that the values we hold dear endure. This won’t be easy, but the threats we observe compel us to defend them. Institutions safeguarding these values must address current problems and challenges. The European Union itself is a clear example of the absence of an end of history – starting with 6 states and now 27, soon possibly over 30 including Ukraine.
I wouldn’t succumb to excessive pessimism. Just recently, many feared Marine Le Pen’s victory in France, with some reconciling to her party gaining a majority, only for the election results to turn out differently. There are still three years until the French presidential elections, but it’s evident that the path to victory is not straightforward, contrary to some assumptions.
The outcome of the US presidential elections, leading the democratic world, will also be crucial. It would be dire if they veered towards an authoritarian-democratic system with a narcissistic leader. This currently raises my greatest concerns.
Life is a struggle where we must ensure our values are effectively communicated to society, gather people around them, and win elections. Ukraine is a remarkable and inspiring example – in extremely unfavorable conditions, facing such a formidable and aggressive neighbor, it fights to be a democratic, free, sovereign and Western-oriented state. This is impressive – Ukraine deserves honor and support for its resilience.
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