‘The US Needs to Learn a Great Deal From What Ukraine Has Done’ – Gen. David Petraeus

Gen. David Petraeus, US Army (Ret.) is the former Commander of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan; former Director of the CIA; and co-author of the New York Times bestselling book Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine. He was sanctioned by Vladimir Putin over two years ago.

US aid: too little too late?

KP: The US has been providing robust aid to Ukraine, especially with the passage of the $61 billion military aid package in April. Yet you and others have pointed out that Washington has been consistently slow in making its decisions to help. The Biden administration has been accused of obliging the Ukrainians to fight with one hand tied behind their back, of wanting the Ukrainians not to win, but to “not lose” – i.e., to survive. Likewise, the Biden administration has been averse to seeing Russia outright lose. Do you share Ukrainians’ assessment that Washington has been overly cautious?

Gen. Petraeus: The US has, of course, provided more overall assistance than just about all other contributing countries put together (though European countries and the EU have now, in aggregate, contributed a bit more than the US in total economic, humanitarian, and security assistance). And the US has provided by far the most security assistance. In fact, without US weapons systems, munitions, vehicles, logistics, coordination, etc., Ukraine would be in a vastly more challenging situation than it is today. Indeed, I believe the US also deserves considerable credit for leading the overall response very early on and ensuring that all Western countries worked together to support Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and destructive invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and has continued to do so ever since diplomatically, economically, and with humanitarian assistance, as well as with enormous security assistance and intelligence support.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine Braces for Critical Winter Phase as Front Line May Shift 35 km Westward

yiv’s plans to draft an additional 160,000 troops by February are underway, though experts doubt they will hit the target, expecting closer to 100,000.

That said, you are correct to note that I have repeatedly questioned why key decisions (the provision of M1 tanks, ATACMS, F-16 aircraft, cluster munitions, etc.) were delayed when it appeared inevitable that they would be approved. At the outset, I think it was reasonable for the US to ensure that particularly sophisticated capabilities would not fall into the hands of the Russians; however, once the Ukrainians demonstrated how hard and how effectively they were willing to fight, those concerns were dispelled. Then the concern apparently was Russian escalation in some fashion, including potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, if the US provided certain weapons systems. But, once again, those concerns proved unfounded. Thus the delays in the weapons systems I highlighted earlier – and reported current restrictions on certain US systems being used against targets on Russian soil – do not seem well founded to me. That said, having sat many times at the Situation Room table in the West Wing of the White House and having felt the weight of responsibility shared by those at that table, I should acknowledge that it is a lot easier to sit where I do now and question the cautious approach than it is when sitting at that table and considering the potential costs of being overly aggressive…

Ukraine has been on the defensive

KP: You have met with the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky since he took over from Gen. Valery Zaluzhny. Have you noticed any specific tactical changes being implemented by Syrsky? As someone intimately familiar with the workings of both the Pentagon and the CIA, what advice would you give him on how to optimize the AFU’s relationship with Washington, its most important supporter?

Gen. Petraeus: I have had very good meetings with Gen. Syrsky since he took over from Gen. Zaluzhny – and I was briefed virtually by him on multiple occasions before that, as well. His approach has appeared very sound to me, especially considering the delay in the decision on additional US support and the challenges of generating additional Ukrainian soldiers and units which Ukraine is now working to overcome in the wake of the lengthy debate in the Rada on the conscription law.

And, in many respects, the Ukrainian approach on use of technology (especially air and maritime drones, with ground robotic systems coming on line, as well) is sheer genius. The fact that Ukraine, without any meaningful naval vessels, could sink over one third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and force it to withdraw from Sevastopol and the western Black Sea is an extraordinary tribute to the Ukrainian tech sector and those in uniform employing the unmanned air and maritime systems that have enabled those operations. (The opening of the western Black Sea is also, of course, critical to the ability of Ukraine to export grain by ship, an important contribution to Ukraine’s fiscal situation and to food security for Egypt and other north African countries, in particular.)

The determination of Ukraine to produce 1 million aerial drones in 12 months is equally extraordinary and has done much to offset the substantially greater number of Russian soldiers than Ukrainians on the front lines…

Gen. Syrsky and the Ministry of Defence have orchestrated all of this very impressively, sending machines rather than men whenever feasible, strengthening defenses in locations where that has been advisable, inflicting enormous casualties on the Russian human wave attacks, ultimately preventing all but incremental gains by the Russians, halting the Russian offensive around Kharkiv well beyond artillery range of the city, and rebuilding Ukraine’s air and missile defenses and other critical capabilities as US assistance resumed a couple of months ago.

Moreover, having spent time with American commanders at all levels in Europe, from the theater level to the teams in Kyiv, I can assure you that the relationships between US and European leaders and their Ukrainian counterparts are of enormous mutual trust and admiration. The approaches of the Minister of Defense and Gen. Syrsky have been very helpful in ensuring such relationships.

Finally, given the recent offensive into the Kursk Oblast of Russia, it is clear that Ukraine is not solely on the defensive any more, as your question implied!

Air superiority

Now with a limited number of F-16s in Ukraine, how do you see that presence affecting front lines, which have been getting hammered by Russian glide bombs? Will the F-16s be used only against Russian aircraft, or could they be used against ground targets? More generally, how revolutionary is the development of UAVs (and USVs at sea for that matter) in this war within the context of military history?

Gen. Petraeus: The long overdue arrival of the F-16s will be of enormous importance to Ukraine over time but not a true game-changer in the near term, I don’t think. The systems will be much more capable than the MiGs they replace, but the numbers will be modest at the outset and they will likely be used in a conservative manner as the pilots and the numerous ground support elements build their capabilities. And, needless to say, the Russians will be trying to shoot them down and hit the bases where they are based and from which they may operate.

A good bit depends on the munitions and radar and other systems provided, of course; regardless, the capabilities the F-16s bring will force the Russian aircraft to be even more cautious than they already are (for example, rarely flying into Ukrainian airspace, where the air defenses have proven so lethal, and seldom, if ever, providing true “close air support” (right on top of the troops on the ground). The F-16s can employ air-to-ground as well as air-to-air munitions, but they will need to be cautious until they have a sense of the Russian air and ground capabilities against them and the respective abilities of each side to “see” and engage the other.

My expectation is that the early focus of the Ukrainian F-16s will be on what are termed defensive counter-air missions, seeking to push Russian aircraft back even further from the frontlines and, in some cases, pushing them out of the ability to range at some of the Ukrainian locations that have previously been vulnerable to the very destructive Russian glide bomb attacks. But, it will take additional F-16s, considerable air and ground experience, and development of all the components of Western aircraft and support elements before the addition of the F-16s begins to truly transform the situation.

On your other questions, as should be clear from my earlier observations, Ukrainian production and employment of air and maritime drones has, indeed, been revolutionary – truly path-breaking, in fact. Indeed, the US and other countries need to learn a great deal from what Ukraine has done – and likely will do – even as unmanned ground systems are introduced in larger numbers, as well!

The ability of Ukraine to throw thousands of aerial drones at Russian soldiers on the battlefield every day – and also to strike strategic targets inside Russia nightly, as well – is truly game-changing. And Ukraine’s ability to employ vast number of electronic warfare [EW] “bubbles” of various sizes all over the battlefield and around headquarters and bases and important infrastructure is also hugely impressive. So have been the ever evolving software components and enablers of all of these technological advances, as their constant refinement and improvement, increasingly involving AI [artificial intelligence], have been the critical element that has enabled the drones to evade Russian EW and air defense systems and engage targets heavily protected by Russian assets. (All of this should suggest, by the way, that Ukraine will be a major exporter of unmanned systems when its domestic requirements are ultimately reduced…)

Intelligence and war

KP: Much of Ukraine’s most surprising successes would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, without the help of US intelligence assistance. The Ukrainians’ ability to rid Crimea and much of the Black of the Russian fleet comes to mind. There has been talk of mutual distrust. The Americans are worried that the SBU might be infiltrated by Russia, as well as annoyed by Ukraine’s withholding information from Washington and general lack of transparency. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians feel the US has been too willing to cut a deal with Moscow that would push Kyiv into accepting concessions. As a retired general and former director of the CIA, how do you assess the relationship between Ukrainian intelligence services (particularly HUR, which the US had a hand in creating, according to the NY Times) and those of the US/NATO?

Gen. Petraeus: Given the sensitivity of these issues, I will not comment in detail other than to note (based on numerous engagement with various Ukrainian and American elements) that the relationships between our respective, multiple intel services are absolutely superb – regardless of whatever political friction might manifest itself from time to time. Beyond that, I think the US Administration has been absolutely right, from the outset, to assert that it will engage in “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” I have certainly not seen a US willingness “to cut a deal with Moscow,” as you put it in your question.

Presidential campaign

Which of the two candidates for president, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, in your opinion, is more likely to help Ukraine win (with win, in this case meaning a return to the pre-2022 lines of control at the least)? Similarly, which candidate is better able to rein in Vladimir Putin’s revanchist project.

Gen. Petraeus: I’m afraid that I don’t engage in domestic politics in the US, so I will leave this to others, while noting that there is very strong bipartisan support in the US Congress for continued assistance to Ukraine and that both of the current candidates ultimately supported the most recent (enormous) package of assistance for Ukraine.

Let me conclude by offering my personal view that the US and all freedom-loving nations of the world should do all that we possibly can to enable Ukraine to halt the incremental Russian gains and build the capacity for future offensive operations (including further remarkable technological advances and training and equipping of substantial additional Ukrainian forces) to enable Ukraine to liberate as much of its territory as is absolutely possible – in order ultimately to dramatically change the situation on the battlefield to provide Ukraine the leverage needed for the future. Ukraine is fighting the common enemy of NATO and has already destroyed roughly half of its tank fleet, among other capabilities. And we should strive to do all that we can to ensure that Russia’s revanchist, revisionist, grievance-filled view of history and aggression are halted and reversed in Ukraine – as Putin would not stop there if he were to be successful – with the goal of not just preservation of Ukraine’s independence, but also membership in the EU and NATO. Doing this will also send a very important message to the rest of the world and do a great deal to shore up deterrence against other would-be aggressors.

As [Andrew Roberts and I] note in Conflict, what takes place in one part of the world often reverberates in other parts of the world as well. And ensuring success in Ukraine is critical in that regard. Slava Ukraini.