Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, on Tuesday Aug. 20, adopted a new law regarding the activities of religious organizations. Law No. 8371, passed by a majority of 265 votes, would, after ratification by President Volodymyr Zelensky, prohibit the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine and terminate the activities of religious structures affiliated with Moscow.
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Both the majority of representatives of Zelensky’s Servant of the People party and Petro Poroshenko’s opposition European Solidarity voted for the bill.
At the same time, a few lawmakers opposed it. In particular, members from the formerly pro-Russian Opposition Platform for Life and Peace party, as well as several of their supporters. This group is known for its support of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is subordinate of the Moscow Patriarchate (albeit with broad autonomy), and they understood that the bill was primarily directed against the UOC.
Some critics (many of them pro-Russian propagandists, such as Tucker Carlson) have used the issue to claim there is religious persecution in Ukraine. Kyiv Post examined what the new law entails and whether it is a threat to part of the Orthodox community in Ukraine.
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Historical context
Historically, Kyiv and Ukraine belonged to the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, by which they were baptized in 988. This continued until 1685, when the Tsardom of Muscovy, which by that time had captured the eastern part of Ukraine and Kyiv, bribed and pressured Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople to transfer the Kyiv See to Moscow. Just six months later, Dionysius was deposed by the Council of Bishops of Constantinople for this betrayal. Moscow, however, which had control over Ukrainian lands, refused to relinquish the Kyiv Metropolis.
The Kyiv See remained part of the Moscow Patriarchate during its time under the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The Russian Empire used Kyiv’s scientific and human potential to provide educated clergy and laymen from Ukraine to expand its influence in Siberia and Asia.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, in the turmoil of the civil war, Ukrainians created an independent Orthodox church in 1921, which was soon suppressed. Nevertheless, it managed to thrive in the diaspora as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
During the Soviet era, Orthodoxy in Ukraine was subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, which itself became a victim of Stalin’s terror. Over time the ROC became an obedient appendage to the Soviet special services.
After Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, some of the pro-Ukrainian clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate decided to secede and create an independent church. This is a historical process similar to what happened in other Orthodox nations. For example, Greece declared the Church of Greece independent from Constantinople after gaining independence in the 1830s. The reason was that the Patriarchs of Constantinople, located in Istanbul, were dependent on the Turkish Sultan, against whom the Greeks fought for independence.
A similar process took place in Ukraine, but Moscow strongly condemned those who left the Moscow Patriarchate, even declaring a church anathema against them. At the same time, the Moscow Patriarchate created the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which was ostensibly autonomous but governed by Moscow.
Until 2019, Moscow and its allies in Ukraine invested heavily in discrediting the independent Orthodox movement, calling it “nationalist” and “schismatic.”
Finally, in 2019, the Ukrainian Orthodox who had broken away from Moscow received official canonical status. They united among themselves, attracted some pro-Ukrainian clergy from the Moscow Patriarchate, and with the support of President Poroshenko received a decree from the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew, the Orthodox world’s most authoritative prelate, granting recognition and permission for autocephaly.
Since then, Ukraine has seen the emergence of two canonical autocephalous structures recognized by world Orthodoxy: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the newly created Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). The key difference is that the UOC remains subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, while the OCU is linked to Constantinople.
With the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, some of pro-Russian clergy and bishops of the UOC cooperated with the enemy or spread Russian propaganda. According to Ukraine’s Security services (SBU), more than 50 clergy from the UOC are under investigation for treason and collaboration, including 4 bishops.
Although the UOC leadership held a council in 2022 condemning the actions of the ROC, which supported the invasion and even war crimes, the UOC has not completely severed ties with Moscow.
The law does not ban any specific church. It restricts the activities of Ukrainian religious organizations only if they continue cooperating with the aggressor country.
What does the new law mean?
The new law provides for the termination of the activities of religious organizations affiliated with Russia if they do not stop cooperating with Russia at the request of state authorities.
According to Heorhiy Kovalenko, a representative of the OCU who switched from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019, the law does not ban any specific church. Instead, it restricts the activities of Ukrainian religious organizations only if they continue cooperating with the aggressor country.
“Finally, the state has the political will to ensure that religion is not used as a tool for political propaganda and aggression. Religious communities should be focused on religion. The law refers to ‘affiliated’ organizations. The authorized state body conducts an examination and issues an order requesting that the organization cease cooperation with Russia. If they refuse, legal action and the suspension of the organization’s activities may follow. But if the organization severs ties with Russia, it can continue functioning,” Kovalenko told Kyiv Post.
According to religious scholar Andriy Smyrnov, the UOC’s ties with Moscow are administrative, and the Ukrainian bishops must withdraw from its structures.
“It is necessary to remove the Charter of [ROC] Patriarch Alexey II from the UOC’s statutes and withdraw from the Synod of the ROC. Currently, according to the Charter of the ROC, Metropolitan Onufriy of Kyiv is a member of the Synod,” Smyrnov explained.
The Charter of the ROC cannot be changed from within Ukraine, and Moscow is unlikely to take action. However, according to ecclesiastical scholars, this should not be a problem.
“They can make a public statement declaring their withdrawal from these governing bodies. For instance, Metropolitan Panteleimon Povoroznyuk of Luhansk, a member of the UOC, was elected a temporary member of the Synod of the ROC, and he hasn’t been excluded from the UOC. Despite a criminal case for collaboration, the UOC has not stripped him of his role. However, it is unlikely the UOC will take such steps, as they believe the formal separation from the ROC in 2022 is sufficient,” Smyrnov added.
Legal consequences
Can the UOC itself be banned? Our sources say no, and that is not the purpose of the law.
“The UOC, as a religious association, is not a legal entity, so the Church cannot be banned. However individual legal entities, such as the administrative center of the Kyiv Metropolis and diocesan administrations, can be stopped. Contracts for the lease or use of state property with Russian-affiliated structures, of which the UOC uses over 3,000, may also be terminated,” Smyrnov explained.
Even if some Russian-affiliated structures refuse to sever ties with Russia, they will not be immediately banned, as the legal process could take years. The UOC says it is prepared for this.
“The UOC is a church. Its goal is to provide believers with conditions to practice their faith and spiritual freedom. Millions of our believers are Ukrainian citizens, many serve in the Armed Forces or are war veterans. If the fundamental rights and freedoms of these people are violated, I am sure they will find legal means, including in courts, to defend them,” UOC spokesman Metropolitan Klyment (Vecherya) said.
As Ukraine’s legal system is often slow, particularly in wartime, cases could be delayed for years. However, the state has set a nine-month period for religious organizations to break ties with Russia.
The Russian-linked Church itself cannot be banned, and that is not the purpose of the law.
Competitors
The UOC may receive additional motivation to sever ties with Russia, as legal challenges could prompt more priests and communities to move to the OCU.
“This is not about banning Orthodoxy or faith, but about severing ties with the Russian Federation,” Smyrnov noted.
“The law does not violate personal freedoms of conscience or religion. People are free to pray wherever and however they choose. If it is state property, citizens can transfer it to the OCU to preserve it. We may see more transfers of priests, although bishops are less likely to follow,” Smyrnov said.
The OCU generally welcomes anyone wishing to join, although defections may not happen immediately.
“Once decisions are made regarding the UOC, it takes time for believers to become disillusioned. After the 2022 Council, it took several months for people to realize the UOC wasn’t making progress. We expect something similar here – defections may start in a few months,” Heorhiy Kovalenko said.
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