Changes to Moscow's nuclear doctrine will mean that aggression by a state that does not possess nuclear weapons but is backed by a nuclear-armed state will in future be categorised as an attack on Russia by a nuclear power. Commentators are unanimous that the Kremlin's main objective here is to discourage Western military aid for Ukraine, but opinions differ regarding the consequences.
No reason to panic
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The West must not let itself be intimidated, The Spectator (UK) urges:
“Nuclear doctrines are not ironclad laws of statecraft that determine when a state will resort to using nuclear weapons. In reality, the decision always comes down to a world leader who will decide whether or not to press the proverbial red button. Second, and relatedly, nuclear doctrines are purposefully vague. In other words, it is important to leave your adversaries guessing as to when the threshold for a nuclear response might be crossed. ... The announced doctrine change is therefore less about a fundamental change in Russian nuclear policy and more about a signalling effort to Western audiences.”
A dictatorship needs no doctrine
In a Telegram post picked up by Echo (Russia), political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov dectects a certain nervousness in Moscow:
“Doctrines are important if you have a constitutional state, separation of powers and all the other features of democracy. But mafia-like, totalitarian states have long been murdering people without any doctrine at all. Viewed objectively, the change in the doctrine is practically meaningless for Russia. But from a psychological perspective it reveals the Kremlin's growing nervousness: 'Hey, are you completely deaf? We have the bomb, the b-o-m-b!' Does this mean that the Kremlin will not use nuclear weapons? Not at all. The chances of this are significantly higher in a state of panic.”
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Threatening scenarios more effective than bombs
De Standaard (Belium) looks at whether Putin could really resort to nuclear weapons:
“Experts say that tactical nuclear weapons make little sense from a military perspective in this phase of the war. The front is far too broad for that. If they were to fall on a city like Kharkiv or Kyiv, they would of course cause many casualties. But the consequences would probably end up depriving Putin of the relatively small advantage he now has in this war. He will no doubt have made the same calculation. Threatening with the use of these weapons will bring him more for the time being.”
Sugar for Trump, vinegar for Biden
Neatkarīgā (Latvia) sheds light on the Kremlin leader's motives:
“Putin is trying to score points with Trump by threatening the world with a nuclear disaster if the West continues to support Ukraine, or, even worse, if it increases its military aid. ... Then there's what is, perhaps, the main reason: Biden is scheduled to visit Berlin from 10 to 12 October. ... Putin's demonstrative amendment of the nuclear doctrine is clearly intended to prevent Western leaders from becoming 'too keen' and considering providing more serious military aid to Ukraine. ... Admittedly, this method of Putin's has worked pretty well so far. However, it has one major flaw: its effectiveness decreases with each successive threat.”
This bluff could work
In view of the forthcoming US election Moscow's tactics could pay off, notes NV (Ukraine):
“On the one hand, it's good news that Putin is being forced to go the whole hog. After all, this is never a sign of strength and confidence. It means that the new possibilities for the Ukrainian armed forces to hit targets in Russia - and the pending permission to attack targets 300 kilometres away - are causing Putin and his team great anxiety. And he is doing everything in his power to prevent this. On the other hand, this bluff will most likely work. With just a month to go before the election, the US government will hardly dare do something that will trigger fears of a nuclear crisis.”
The spectre of nuclear war
The new doctrine is a dangerous development, Yeni Mesaj (Turkey) puts in:
“Could the worst-case scenario become reality? Putin outlined it years ago during another crisis: 'If in the first act you have hung a pistol on the wall, then in the following one it must be fired.' In the same way, if the Western countries continue their policy of fuelling the increasingly bitter war in Ukraine, they will touch the trigger of their nuclear weapons with their hands. ... The two previous world wars broke out in a much less tense environment than the current one. This new war on our doorstep, ignited in Ukraine, could become both the Third World War and the first nuclear war.”
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