Executive Summary

From March 2022 to September 2024, there were at least 363 438 advertisements of the contract service posted in one of the key Russian social media VK. With mobilisation being a sensitive issue, the state focuses on recruiting "volunteers" through contracts, a practice often referred to as “covert mobilisation.” 

Between August and September 2024, there was a marked increase in promotions encouraging Russians to enlist in the army. In August alone, advertisements rose by 224% compared to July. This surge can be attributed to the Ukrainian army's incursion into the Kursk region and the Russian Ministry of Defence's plan to expand military personnel. 

There are six main topics used by the Russian government to recruit people that are generally mentioned in contract service promotions. Among the most popular are high salaries for contract soldiers (featured in 74% of ads), social benefits for soldiers and veterans (64%), and patriotic sentiment (35%). 

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Money seems to be the main driver for potential soldiers. At the end of July,  Vladimir Putin doubled the one-time payment for new signees from the federal budget. This increase correlates with the raise of interest in contract service – in August, there were 66% more search queries about signing a contract than in July (based on Yandex, the most popular search engine in Russia). 

Economic Woes Mount for Russia‘s War Machine
Other Topics of Interest

Economic Woes Mount for Russia‘s War Machine

The latest setback for the Kremlin came last week, when inflation accelerated to 8.9 percent in November, according to official statistics.

Pro-Kremlin bots are used to improve attitudes towards contract service artificially. The comments under publications of contract service ads reached the peak in terms of positive sentiment during August and September 2024. The share of positive comments is 63% and 67%, respectively, compared to the average of 44% during the first 7 months of 2024. However, 76.6% of all positive comments from August to September 2024 (more than 1K messages) were written by bot accounts. However, as most of the comments might be written by bots or employees of local municipalities.  

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The surge in contract service ads suggests Russia is struggling to sustain its military efforts in Ukraine. Although significant financial incentives have driven interest in the contract service, it is a serious burden for the economy. From July 2023 to June 2024, the salaries and other payments for the military consumed 1.5% of the Russian GDP. This percentage might increase since the payments for the new recruits were raised multiple times throughout summer 2024. As military spending consumes a growing share of the budget, Russia may face increased economic strain, potentially leading to further mobilisation efforts.

Introduction

‍During the full-scale invasion, the Russian army has two ways of recruiting soldiers – mobilisation and contract service. The active wave of mobilisation officially took place from September to October 2022. Since the end of it, there have been rumours about the second wave of mobilisation. However, new mobilisation is tied to socio-political risks for the Russian government. 

‍Since spring of 2023 there have been a growing amount of contract service promotions – a way to mobilise new soldiers without formally declaring the mobilisation. The key incentives to join the army consists of big one-time payments and a salary that is higher than the average. If a person signs the contract, they receive a one-time payment of 400 000 Rubles from the federal budget (~$4 300) and up to 1 900 000 from the regional budget (~$20 500). This is 50 times more than the median monthly salary in Russia – $488. In some regions of Russia it takes up to 4 years or even more to earn the equivalent on a civic job. 

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‍Contract service promotions have been widespread across Russia, appearing on streets, TV, and social media. On social media alone, over 40 000 ads were published during the summer and the first two weeks of September, with 72% of them appearing on VK.

We collected 612 452 publications related to military service from June 4 to September 10, 2024 and extracted 42 308 publications about contract services. These publications came from key Russian social media platforms like VK, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, as well as federal and local news sites (e.g., tatar-inform.ru, kazan.bezformata.com, rbc.ru).

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We identified VK as a key channel for recruiting to the Russian army and focused on it in our analysis. After another iteration of data gathering, we extracted additional 363 438 publications promoting contract services from March 2022 to September 2024. A detailed outline of our methods is available in the Methodology section.

August 2024 was a busy season for the Russian army in terms of recruiting promotion. We identified a 224% increase in the number of contract services ads in August compared to July. ‍

This is tied to the Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region. The incursion made concerns about the potential new wave of mobilisation grow – during the first week of it (August 6-13), approximately 39% of content related to military service (media publications, posts from ordinary users) mentioned Kursk incursion. In July, ISW stated that the Russian government wants to expand combat power avoiding general mobilisation. One of the mechanisms of avoidance is contract service. 

The topic of contract services is prominent within broader discussions of military service in Russia. On VK, a key social media in Russia, contract promotions accounted for 39% of all mobilisation-related content in August.

Contract Service Promotion Trends

During Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the first spike of contract services promotion in VK dates back to September 2022 – the declaration of partial mobilisation in Russia. There were 6 206 ads published in September – a 65% increase to the previous month. Another smaller surge occurred in November that year, following the liberation of Kherson (4 791 posts, 7% more than in October and 37% more than in August – the last month before mobilisation declaration). 

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In 2023, the average number of contract promotions began to rise again alongside the start of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive in May. In June 2023, there were 12 375 ads posted, which was 40% higher than the previous month. 

In 2024, another surge occurred in April. This might be related to several factors. In March 2024, former Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu announced plans to increase the size of the Russian army. Another explanation might be related to instrumentalisation of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. At the beginning of April 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported a growing number of people who signed a contract with the army. MoD claimed that the majority of newly arrived soldiers were motivated by the “desire to avenge those killed in the tragedy”.  

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However, the most significant promotion began shortly after the Ukrainian army’s offensive in the Kursk region. In August 2024, the number of such ads increased by 224% compared to July, reaching 70 572 ads per month.

The average number of publications per month is also growing. In 2022, the average was 2 702. In 2023, it rose to 10 291. So far, during 8 full months of 2024, the average number is 23 394.   

Also, the rise of ads number is echoed by potential volunteers’ internet behaviour. We identified the similar trend based on Yandex Wordstat data. The number of search queries for the phrase “contract for SMO” (Special Military Operation, the official term used to describe the invasion) in August 2024 amounted to 321 000, which is 66% higher than the previous month. The dynamics appear more significant if compared to a period from March to December of 2022. During that period, there were 27 781 search queries. This means a 1057% if only August 2024 is compared to 10 months of 2022. For the last year, since September 2023 to September 2024, on average 6 800 Runet users made such queries each month. In 5 400 cases, users clicked on links in the search results.

High Salaries are the Main Topic in the Contract Service Ads

Ninety percent of all advertisements were posted in public groups, with the remaining 10% promoted by individual accounts. Among group types, official entities—such as city and district administrations, and councils of deputies—posted the most ads (39%), followed by regional media (8%). Job search and classified ad groups accounted for 7% of the ads. Also, contract service ads also even appeared in cultural community organisations, kindergartens, schools, and religious groups. Below are examples of such ads:‍

“There are now many more people willing to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Everyone can contribute to our victory.” (ad featured on a kindergaten page)

“Defending your homeland means being responsible for the future of the country! Contract military service is your right choice!” (ad on a school page)

We identified six key topics featured in contract services advertisements. They are not mutually exclusive, so several topics might be featured in one advertisement. For example, “high salary” topic is often combined with the other 5. Below are definitions of such topics and examples of contract services advertising featuring them:  

  • High salary (featured in 74% of publications). This is the biggest cluster of contract services advertisements. It mentions salaries and one-time payments for soldiers who sign the contract. First of all, this topic targets people with financial issues, such as those in debt. Contract soldier salaries are significantly higher than the national average, especially in economically disadvantaged regions with low social mobility. For example, a private’s salary is 210 000 Rubles – 2.6 times higher than the average of 82 000. The disparity is even greater for regions where the salaries are lower (in 2023, Forbes Russia listed 100 municipalities where the average salary is lower than 30 000 Rubles). Combined with one-time payments that consist of 400 000 from the federal budget and a sum up to 1 950 000 Rubles from the regional budget, this is an attractive opportunity for people with low-to-middle salaries. There is evidence that this strategy works, as seen by the rise in bank account balances in regions with weaker economies. 

“WE ACCEPT VOLUNTEERS FOR SERVICE UNDER A CONTRACT FROM THE MILITARY REGISTRATION OFFICE OF MOSCOW‼ ONE-TIME payment - 2,300,000 thousand‼💰 SALARY: from 260,000 Rubles monthly in the SMO zone☑ WE ACCEPT VOLUNTEERS FOR SERVICE UNDER A CONTRACT FROM THE MILITARY REGISTRATION OFFICE OF NIZHNY NOVGOROD‼ ONE-TIME payment - 1.200.000‼” 

“The one-time payment to families of Ural residents who signed a contract to serve in the SMO has been increased by 100 thousand rubles. Thus, the total amount of the payment from August 1 will be more than 900 thousand rubles.”

  • Benefits (64%). This cluster highlights social support and privileges, such as simplified university enrolment for soldiers' children and real estate discounts. Housing is a particularly strong incentive, as over 80% of people in Russia cannot afford to buy an apartment.‍

“Contract service is the choice of those who are looking for a stable job with good social guarantees, professional development and the opportunity to serve their country. Main features of contract service” 

“Subsidies for additional gasification of housing are one of the measures of the comprehensive system of support for participants in a special military operation and their families ... "Let me remind you that those entering military service under a contract receive a special status, which implies not only federal and regional payments, but also free medical care, budget places for children to study at universities and free vacations in summer camps, the opportunity to apply for a military mortgage and much more"”

  • Patriotism (35%). Such messages mostly appeal to patriotic feelings of Russians and mention a “threat” from either Ukraine or the West for Russia and its sovereignty. This narrative, long used in Russian propaganda, aims to rally people during crises. Moreover, it depicts Russia as a “good hero” fighting for a noble cause against the “bad” West, specifically pointing out that Russia is defending itself.‍

“If for you the Motherland is not just an empty phrase, if you are a true patriot of your Russian land, then there is no doubt that you will defend its borders!” 

“Choose the opportunity without wasting time! Contract service is the security of our Motherland.”

  • Prestige (14%). This topic mentions that the soldier will be highly valued by the state and well respected in the society. It mostly portrays the army as a means of having a meaning of life and being an essential part of the society. ‍

“❗ Contract service in the Russian Armed Forces is a prestigious and noble cause💯” 

“Contract service is a prestigious job. People who have decided to become professional soldiers come to the regional recruitment point for military service under a contract every day. Paying a debt to the Motherland, showing a civic position and helping the country in difficult times are the main reasons that Kostroma residents cite when signing a contract with the Ministry of Defence.”

  • Masculinity (5%). This cluster appeals to patriarchal stereotypes about the image of the “real man”. It operates a logic of being “man enough” – a concept that is recognised by both Russian men and women. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, one of the main features of a “real man” is power. This trait is often used in the contract service ads. ‍

“Contract service is a conscious choice of a real man. Thanks to state support, volunteers continue to join the ranks of servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” 

“Contract service is a job for real men! Contract military service is the defence of our Motherland. Contract service is an opportunity to demonstrate your civic position, to become part of the Russian Armed Forces, which are fighting Nazism as part of a special military operation.” 

  • Personal stories (0.2%). This cluster features stories of individuals already serving in the army, primarily shared by regional media and local municipalities. These narratives spotlight local residents, aiming to make the army feel more relatable and "alive" by showcasing real people, often implicitly described as neighbours.‍

“The 28-year-old fighter with the call sign "Dizil" has been in the SMO zone since 2022. For his combat achievements, he received the medal "For Bravery, 2nd degree" and the Order of Courage. Mikhail's service history began long before mobilization. He studied at the Ryazan Cossack Cadet Corps named after Skobelev. After that, he served in the Airborne Forces special forces. "When the SMO began, I knew that sooner or later I would have to leave my loved ones, my home, and stand up for the defense of the Motherland," the serviceman said.” 

“Tokarevka contract soldier ready to return to SMO zone after rehabilitation. Nikolay Kolpakov from Tokarevka has been participating in the special operation as a squad commander for over a year. In May, the soldier received a bullet wound to the shoulder. Nikolay is currently undergoing treatment in a hospital in St. Petersburg.— After rehabilitation, I am planning to return to the special military operation zone again; my guys are still there, waiting for my speedy return. While in the SMO zone, I understood a lot, especially the value of life and a peaceful sky above my head.” 

‍Although the general distribution of the topics over time stays mostly the same, we noticed a trend of “masculine” rhetoric surpassing the “prestige” argument that had been more popular before August 2024. We also noticed a slight increase of the “high salary” topic in the ads during August. This might be explained by the increase of the one-time payment at the end of July. Back then, Vladimir Putin raised one-time payments from the state budget from 195 000 Rubles to 400 000 Rubles. Although payments from some regional budgets had been raised several times before July, the nationwide raise pulled up the total for the regions with low levels of regional payments. 14% of August-September ads directly referenced this increase. 

How Promotions are Distributed in the Regions

‍Public VK groups often include their location, allowing us to identify the regions. We found geographic references in 75% of all publications. The Voronezh region had the highest number of contract service posts (43 posts per 1 000 men in the region), followed by the Irkutsk region (25 per 1 000 men). In the top 10 regions, there is only one national republic – Republic of Karelia, which is one of the leading regions in terms of casualty percentage, according to Mediazona and BBC.

The fewest announcements were found in Crimea, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Stavropol Krai, Tomsk Oblast, and North Ossetia.

According to Yandex Wordstat queries data, the lowest interest levels are observed among residents of central and northwestern regions, particularly in the capital cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, as well as in the three Caucasus republics—Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. While the government is trying to stimulate demand in the first group of regions through high financial rewards, which have so far been unsuccessful, there is little promotion in these Caucasus republics, both on VK and in terms of financial incentives. We assume that smaller amounts of advertising in these regions might be related to either weaker internet coverage or different behaviours in terms of information consumption. This means more prominence of other channels of contract service promotion (such as outdoor advertising, sending brochures by post, publishing ads in local newspapers, communicating through work collectives). There is also a tendency of “contract migration” – residents of regions with smaller one-time payments travel to another region with a higher payment to sign a contract.

‍The highest interest in contract service is found in the regions of the Urals, southern Russia, and Siberia. Notably, Kurgan Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai, Oryol Oblast, Stavropol Krai, and Arkhangelsk Oblast stand out. They are followed by the national republics of Kalmykia, Komi, Buryatia, and Altai. 

‍The regions with low number of contract service advertisements does not necessarily mean that residents of these regions serve less in the army – this might mean one of the limitations of social media analysis that does not take into account offline advertising. On the other hand, regions that show high interest in contract service are the ones that have weaker economies. For example, several regions with the highest interest, such as Zabaykalsky Krai, Kurgan Oblast, and Buryatia are among the poorest regions in Russia with nearly 20% of the population in these regions living below the poverty threshold. 

How Russians React to Contract Service Promotions

‍Apart from analysing 363 438 advertisements, we dived deeper into the comments section. In total, we found 230 000 comments under contract service advertisements. Nearly 50 000 comments were dedicated to offering condolences to those affected or killed in the war in Ukraine. A large number of comments (11 000) focused on financial matters, such as how to receive payments and their amounts, while 9 000 comments were about the nuances of signing and fulfilling contracts, and another 8 000 expressed gratitude and wished good luck. A smaller number (about 1 500) were concerned with mobilisation and the anxieties surrounding it.

‍Using sentiment analysis, we examined how users’ attitudes toward military contracts have evolved since March 2022. The data shows that during the mobilisation period in October 2022, negative comments made up 64% — the lowest sentiment score over the entire period. Many users expressed concerns about the shortage of contract soldiers at the front, which prompted authorities to mobilise the population. Additionally, there was widespread dissatisfaction regarding the perceived unfairness of one-time financial incentives, which were only offered to new recruits who signed contracts after the fall of 2022.

‍Over time, the volume of negative comments remained higher until August 2024. However, we observed a significant positive shift in sentiment from July to September 2024. In July, there were 46% of positive comments attributed to the contract service – a 10% increase compared to October 2022. In September, the ratio reached 67%. This marks the first time since the beginning of the invasion that positive comments about contract service formed a majority.  Below are examples of comments posted since August 2024:

“everyone has their own reasons for signing a contract, but what remains unchanged is that our government is ready to support each soldier and his family while he is not at home”

“In general, it is now profitable to sign contracts as much as possible, and the conditions and benefits are improving every time”

‍The comments highlight the beneficial conditions of contract services, mentioning high one time payments and salaries with generous social support from the state. However, there are signs of inauthentic coordinated behaviour as most of the comments might be written by bots or employees of local municipalities. For example, 76.6% of all positive comments from August to September 2024 (more than 1K messages) that mentioned contract service were written by bot accounts.

Conclusion

‍The significant increase in contract service promotions during August and September 2024 indicates that Russia is struggling to maintain its military efforts against Ukraine. The Kursk region incursion was a clear symptom of Russian inability to simultaneously conduct offensive and protect its borders. Consequently, the army requires more personnel to address new combat zones and sustain its presence in existing ones. In this case, extensive advertising of contract services is a way to recruit new people without formally declaring a new wave of mobilisation – a step that carries substantial socio-political risks for the Russian regime, as acknowledged by regime representatives.

‍In this context, recruiting contract soldiers is the primary means to compensate for losses and maintain the status quo. In the last several months the one-time payments for recruits have significantly increased, reaching almost 2 000 000 Rubles (~$21 600), initially starting at 100 000 - 200 000 Rubles. This influenced Russians’ interest in contract service. The rise in payments affected online behaviour, resulting in a 66% increase in Yandex queries related to contract services. However, this effect is likely to be short-term since such payments have serious pressure on the Russian budget

‍While it is difficult to predict the duration of this extensive campaign, but it might have mid-to-long term consequences on the Russian economy, driving the budget deficit and the reduction of expenditures on other sectors. Bloomberg reported that Russia plans to allocate 40% of its expenditures to military spending, amounting to $142 billion (6.2% of the GDP) – the highest in Russian post-Soviet history. Additionally, according to Re:Russia, salaries and payments for military personnel consume up to 1.5% of the Russian GDP. Ultimately, the high salaries and one-time payments could significantly strain the Russian economy, potentially leading to a point where the regime won’t be able to maintain them. That might be a moment when Russia will declare a new wave of mobilisation to cope with combat losses – a measure that does not require such expenses per new soldier.

Methodology

‍During the observation period from June 6 to September 10, we sourced 612,452 publications related to mobilisation and serving in the army. Based on this data, we extracted 42 308 publications particularly featuring contract services promotion. Among the main channels of information are social media (VK, Odnoklassniki and Telegram). Other sources included federal and local news outlets such as tatar-inform.ru, kazan.bezformata.com, rbc.ru.

‍After identifying VK as a key channel for recruiting potential contract signees, we used the VK API to extract 1.8 million publications on contract services from the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion until the present (March 2022 - September 2024). We then filtered these using additional keywords and regular expressions. As a result, we obtained a dataset containing 363K publications promoting contract services.

‍We compared regional data on the number of posts (normalised by the male population in the regions) with data on one-time payments for signing a contract and the rate of their increase in the regions (according to Novaya Gazeta.Europe and iStories), data on casualties (according to Mediazona), and data on Yandex search queries (according to Wordstat). We did not find strong correlations between these indicators.

‍We used data from Botnadzor project to identify bot activity in VK.

‍Sentiment towards the advertisements in the comments was identified using a machine learning model. To measure the attitude towards the topic we calculated the proportion of positive comments to negative ones. As a result, the sentiment expressed in the posts, comments, and articles is normalised on the scale from 0 to 1. A value of 0 indicates the most negative sentiment, while a value of 1 indicates the most positive sentiment.

This research was reprinted from https://www.openminds.ltd/ with the author's permission. You can find the original article here. 

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