Kyiv Post speaks with Germany’s CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman, Jürgen Hardt, on how the “epochal rupture” in the transatlantic relationship could affect Germany’s position towards Ukraine and European security.
MJM: If the US is no longer an ally to be trusted, will a new German government stay committed to maintaining both the territorial integrity of Ukraine and keeping what remains?
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JH: To us, maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine is nothing we will ever question. It is something that can only be changed by violence and that a new German government will not accept. Even if Ukraine is forced to give up some of its territory as part of a ceasefire or a dictated peace agreement, it is something we will not accept.
MJM: Your position does not sound too different to that of the Scholz government of the past three years. His true goals towards Ukraine and Russia have remained nebulous with his indecisive policies having negatively contributed to the current situation at the front. What makes you think that a new government under Friedrich Merz will be more determined to maintain Ukraine’s territorial integrity?
JH: In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, Germany found itself in the same situation – we accepted the existence of a second German state as a fact without giving up the claim to the former territory. Then, in 1990, the unity of Germany was restored. There is no need or reason to recognize the violent division of a country even if it has become a fact which must temporarily be accepted. But Kyiv must admit that it currently does not have the strength to resist this reality.
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MJM: Would you say the history of the German occupation of Soviet Ukraine under Hitler as well as Germany’s historical experience of having been a divided country are two important reasons for a new German government to renew its commitment to Ukraine?
JH: Of course, the fate of Ukraine is something which comes close to our own historical experience and to which we can relate.
MJM: Friedrich Merz recently announced an “epochal rupture” in German foreign and security policy, while just this week Trump seemed to create one of his own. What will be new about German foreign and security policy under Merz to address such a break-up?
JH: Militarily, we will become more committed to the European part of NATO. That means that by the end of the next four legislative years we will be spending at least 3 percent of German GDP on defense by increasing our defense expenditure by 0.2 or 0.3 percent a year -a total of €10-15 billion [$10.5-16 billion] every year. As for the stationing of German troops within the European part of NATO, we will be asking where they can be most useful to provide security, and we will be doing more. And I do hope that we will support Ukraine a lot more than now – financially as well as with military equipment.
MJM: This all does not sound completely new. So really, where exactly do you see an “epochal rupture”? Is Germany ready to forge a “special relationship” with Ukraine rather than once more with Russia?
JH: Russia finds itself completely on its own with its ideas and aspirations of what Europe should look like in the future. None of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact or the former Soviet Union, including the Central Asian states, want to be dominated by Russia. They all want to determine their own fate. This is how things must stay.
They also all see Moscow as an aggressor and a threat. This will not change because of Donald Trump. We do not have to adapt our opinion becauseTrump wants to deliver on his election promise to make peace within 24 hours. Trump is not interested in bringing about anything reasonable or sustainable. And if Kyiv does not accept a deal struck solely between the US and [Russian President] Vladimir Putin, we will accept Kyiv’s position and continue to support Ukraine. There is very likely to be more support than now.
MJM: So, does this mean Berlin will base this new German foreign and security policy on the belief that “peace with Moscow must inevitably go through Kyiv”? This would in itself seem to be an “epochal rupture” contrary to the former German position that there is no peace in Europe without Russia.
JH: By “epochal rupture” Friedrich Merz is referring to the fact that we and our European partners must react to the doubts that now exist around the US as a reliable security partner. Europe should have reacted much earlier; Trump’s actions were to be expected. The summits in Paris should have taken place a year ago. Really, to be prepared, Chancellor Scholz should have pushed to have these meetings months ago.
MJM: Ukrainians have become skeptical when it comes to Germany and the strategic mentality and readiness of its elites to act when needed. To many, Germany is still in a deep sleep. In my own work I have suggested a new maxim for German foreign and security policy: “never again ignore.” It reflects Germany’s ignorance of Ukraine since 1991 and proposes to re-employ German history for a positive purpose in its foreign and security policy. The idea is to create a stronger foundation for Germany to take the lead and become a benign security provider for Ukraine and Europe.
JH: Germany and Germans do have a special historical responsibility. It is to make sure that a course of events such as unfolded under Hitler will not happen again. Neither in the present nor in the future. This means that, in the here and now, we are responsible for preventing a similar development from taking place. Because we know what it can lead to. At the same time, there have been deficits in Ukraine’s own development towards establishing law and order and democratic practices. For instance, young, elected deputies automatically lost their mandates when they criticized corruption among senior party leaders ...
MJM: … but Russia has never proven to be a more democratic or a less corrupt state than Ukraine. To me, Ukraine is a young, vibrant democracy, albeit having made some mistakes. Should Germany not make sure it will not repeat its mistakes of 2016 after the failure of the Minsk negotiations?
JH: Yes, you are right. When the failure of Minsk became obvious from late 2016 onwards, we should have recognized the dilemma, understood and accepted that Russia is buying time to arm itself to attack Ukraine. We should have given Kyiv the chance to do the same by delivering weapons to Ukraine and to approve of German weapons exports to Ukraine. That is something we are doing now.
MJM: Unfortunately, the actions in 2016 of Merkel, then German chancellor, and former foreign minister Steinmeier, are far from being shining examples of German clear-sightedness and courage.
JH: I agree with you. Germany should have delivered a much stronger and more concrete military contribution to Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and to strengthen Kyiv’s ability to defend itself against Russia.
MJM: Shouldn’t Friedrich Merz’s “epochal rupture” require that Germany shapes a new “security identity”? One which perceives the necessity to build up the capacities of a traditional military power, while at the same time striving to maintain as far as possible its capacities as a Zivilmacht?
JH: This is something that cannot be achieved by talking or being proscriptive. And in Germany, it will most certainly never be the outcome of public discourse. It is something that can only be reached by doing. For example, by Germany assuming a more active military role in the European part of NATO. This situation can only be brought about by the decisions and actions of a ruling government which enjoys the support of a governing majority.
MJM: Mr. Hardt, thank you very much for your time.
Jürgen Hardt is the foreign policy spokesman of the CDU / CSU party within the German Bundestag, the national parliament of Germany.
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