Why and How Russia is Targeting Odesa, Part 2

In Part One of this two-part analysis, Kyiv Post focused on Odesa’s importance to Russia and examined the escalating threats the city faces from missile and drone attacks to assassination.

In this article, Kyiv Post focuses on the 2014 Odesa clashes, and how Russia uses propaganda and political manipulation in an attempt to dominate the city.

The battle for Odesa

Russia’s aggression against Odesa serves as a classic example of Russian hybrid aggression – which isn’t purely violent – Kyiv Post sources have said.

For a long time, the Russian Federation has promoted the myth of Odesa being a Russian city and systematically fought – through supporters or directly through its agents – against anything “Ukrainian” in the city.

“The pro-Russia element, or, let’s say, the electorate in the city, has not disappeared. These are people who were raised on Soviet-era literature and cinema. During Ukraine’s independence, they were heavily influenced by pro-Russia forces, which are still present here,” says Olha Kvasnitska, a member of the Odesa City Council.

The struggle for Odesa between pro-Russia separatists and pro-Ukraine citizens took a head on May 2, 2014, when a “United Ukraine” rally of about 2,000 Ukrainians was attacked by a group of 300 pro-Russian separatists with stones, Molotov cocktails – and gunfire.

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The local authorities and security forces sided with the pro-Russian separatists.

“On May 2, senior positions in government bodies and law enforcement agencies were occupied by individuals connected to Russian special services and organizations. They had their own people embedded in all government structures and various political parties in both the city and regional councils,” Kvasnitska said.

On that day, the Odesa police, infiltrated by Russian intelligence, assisted the pro-Russia separatists attempting to seize power in the city – similar to what had happened in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Photos from the day show the head of the Odesa police, Dmitry Fuchedzhi, calmly interacting with pro-Russia militants, who are later seen shooting at pro-Ukrainian activists from behind his unit with pistols and submachine guns.

However, despite the help from police, the outcome on May 2 proved disastrous for Russia as there were significantly more pro-Ukraine citizens.

The pro-Ukraine rally drove out the pro-Russia separatists – into an encampment at Kulykove Field. There, some pro-Russia separatists barricaded themselves in the nearby Trade Unions House. The two groups threw Molotov cocktails at one another and exchanged gunfire.

In the chaos, the Trade Unions House caught fire and 42 pro-Russian separatists died.

On March 13, the European Court of Human Rights, found that the five “fire origin points, other than the one in the lobby, could only have resulted from actions taken by individuals inside the building.”

Meanwhile, Ukraine was held responsible for allowing the clashes to occur in the first place. As visible from the photo, the police, infiltrated by Russian agents, not only failed to prevent the conflict but had aided the pro-Russians.

May 2 was then exploited by Russian propagandists in the Donbas. In Odesa, the pro-Russian element in the city, though weakened, hasn’t completely disappeared.

“The Odesa police are now working much better. They are still weak, but pro-Ukrainian. The SBU is also actively identifying saboteurs,” says volunteer and activist Kateryna Madens.

“While Russia’s influence has declined and is not what it used to be, it still exists,” she said. “Many notorious deputies of the City Council who fled to Russia after 2014 retained their businesses in Odesa, merely transferring ownership to others. Their supporters are still here. This became evident from the comments on the death of Demyan Hanul, one of the city’s key pro-Ukrainian activists. His opponents immediately emerged, celebrating his murder.”

Pro-Russians and neutrals in Odesa

Opinions on why the pro-Russian electorate remains active in Odesa vary.

Vladyslav Balynskiy, a local public figure who has long monitored pro-Russian provocations in the city, argues that one of Ukraine’s biggest mistakes in 2014 was its failure to prosecute local pro-Russian figures.

“Fuchedzhi fled to Moldova, along with most pro-Russian deputies like [Ihor] Markov. From there, they continued anti-Ukraine activities, and Russian propaganda thrived on this,” Balynskiy said.

However there is no centralized pro-Russian coordination in Odesa, Balynskiy said.

“There is no unified center here. However, Russian special services are operating in the city. I am convinced that the murder of Demyan Hanul was orchestrated by these services. On the other hand, there is a pro-Soviet electorate that helped bring the current mayor, Gennady Trukhanov, to power,” Balynskiy said.

“Trukhanov is not a hostage to the situation – he will not abandon his electorate,” he added.

Trukhanov’s administration has resisted, as activists say, the decommunization of the city, and defended keeping Soviet and Russian names.

Multiple journalistic investigations also allege that Trukhanov holds a Russian passport.

City administration’s reluctance to support the Ukrainization of the city, as activists say, is one of the major concerns for pro-Ukrainian politicians like Kvasnitska.

“Just as an example – city authorities refuse to remove the monument to Russian poet Pushkin from the city center, yet for seven years they have blocked efforts to erect a monument to one of Ukraine’s greatest poetesses, Lesya Ukrainka. They continuously create obstacles. By doing this, Trukhanov’s administration is effectively continuing the policy of Russification,” says Kvasnitska.

Trukhanov denies holding Russian citizenship, however. Furthermore, he invites veterans to public events and says he takes pride in Odesa being one of the leading cities in allocating funds from the local budget to support the Ukrainian army. Recently, he reported that almost 20% of the city budget – Hr.2 billion ($50 million) – had been allocated for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, one of the highest in the country.

Several criminal cases involving the mayor have stalled, and petitions demanding limitations on his powers – particularly after Нanul’s murder – were blocked on the websites of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Office of the President. Some say this is due to Trukhanov’s innocence. Others say it’s “loyalty in exchange for immunity,” with many activists in the city saying the latter.

“It is important to understand that pro-Russian parties – some of which don’t even bother to hide their allegiance – are already preparing for elections. One of them is called the ‘Ukrainian Dream’ – a deliberate parallel to the pro-Russian ‘Georgian Dream’ party. And unfortunately, I must say that pro-Ukrainian forces have far fewer resources,” says Kvasnitska.

Odesa’s future is uncertain. Those interviewed by Kyiv Post are convinced that Russia will continue its efforts to destabilize Odesa through provocations, terrorist attacks, and infiltration of various government structures.

Even were the war to end soon, the struggle for Odesa is likely far from over.