The heated argument between Presidents Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House has rattled the world. A narrative is emerging that Zelensky “blew his shot” for peace – first by claiming last week that Trump lives in a “disinformation sphere,” and now by arguing with the American president and vice president in front of cameras. The argument goes that due to Zelensky’s inability to restrain himself and placate Trump, the offended administration will now abandon Ukraine to its fate of Russian domination. But this narrative ignores several important facts:
1) Zelensky is responsible for representing the interests of Ukrainians and cannot afford to sign an onerous mineral deal without gaining any political concessions or guarantees from Washington. His persistence and insistence on American security guarantees or “backstop” was not “overplaying his hand,” as some have claimed, but his best efforts to achieve something to bring back to his war-weary public. Without a security guarantee framework, the Ukrainians have no reasonable assurance against future Russian hostilities and no incentive to lay down their arms. If the Ukrainians wanted a deal to surrender four oblasts to the Russian Federation and give up their NATO aspirations without any security guarantees, they could easily secure that from Russia, without the help of the Americans.
JOIN US ON TELEGRAM
Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.
US and Ukraine Discuss Date and Location for New Round of Talks
2) While Trump has publicly berated Zelensky for not wanting peace, we have heard no public statement or indication from Russia that it wants peace under the current terms. All available evidence indicates that Putin currently sees Russia in an advantageous position and will try to continue the slow but steady territorial gains in the east and south of Ukraine thus far. Time favors Russia in an attritional war, and while there are warnings that Russia will run into serious problems with its economy, equipment, and manpower in 2026, it continues to have the ability to gain territory at the expense of sometimes hundreds of soldiers per kilometer.
3) The Trump administration had provided every indication that they were never going to provide security guarantees and that they would be discontinuing military and economic aid to Ukraine before the now infamous Feb. 28 meeting. The diplomatic full-court press of French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to Washington indicates the resistance of Trump to provide any role as a security guarantor, rather than its likelihood of happening.
The emergence of the supposed “mineral deal” was never meant to be more than an economic deal, and would not have provided meaningful security guarantees. Leaving aside the question of the extent of Ukraine’s mineral wealth and how much of it is in currently occupied territory, the attention paid to the mineral deal story rests on the premise that if American businesses were in Ukraine, the Russians would not dare attack it. The idea that increased trade and economic relationships will prevent war goes back to classical liberal international relations theory, but despite the high volume of trade between Britain, France and Germany before WWI, this did not prevent the outbreak of conflict. Nor did American oil companies in Kuwait prevent Saddam Hussein from invading in 1990. The pressure to achieve an economic deal, without a security deal, was never going to provide any assurance to Ukraine or Europe that would prevent Russia from continuing hostilities.
Russia will feign interest in a potential partnership with the US to balance against Beijing, while keeping its eyes on its long-term goal of revanchism and hegemony.
A similar argument is that this economic deal could have laid the groundwork for more economic investment and cooperation between the US (or the Europeans) and both Ukraine and Russia. The logic goes that war is terrible for business and once all parties realize how much money we are leaving on the table, then everyone will come to the table to make a deal. This assumes that American companies would invest in Ukraine without a peace deal (a highly risky venture), or in Russia, which has seized Western companies’ assets since the start of the full-scale invasion.
Another talking point emphasizing the need to make peace in Ukraine is that the US needs desperately to normalize US-Russian relations so that we can join forces in containing China. This is the so-called “Reverse Kissinger” strategy, referencing President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger’s ill-fated attempt to peel the Chinese away from the Soviets during Nixon’s historic 1973 visit to Beijing. This attempt at counterbalancing a rival with another rival failed half a century ago, and is even less likely to succeed under current conditions. By all measures, Russia has become increasingly reliant and dependent on China and has no intention of teaming up against its erstwhile patron with its long-term rival, no matter how hard Trump and his team try. Instead, Russia will feign interest in a potential partnership to balance against Beijing, while keeping its eyes on its long-term goal of territorial revanchism and hegemony in Eastern Europe.
On Monday, Zelensky met European leaders who have become increasingly vocal about filling the void of leadership on European security since the now famous comments from Vice President Vance and Defense Secretary Hegseth at the Munich Security Conference. Ukrainians and their international supporters have put their displaced hope into a European solution for Ukraine. Europe’s leaders have loudly and boldly declared the need for Europe to “step up,” and “take the reins” on European security, but have simultaneously insisted that any peacekeeping proposal or trip-wire force in Ukraine would require an American “backstop” (re: Airforce and potential nuclear deterrent); something the Americans have repeatedly and explicitly refused to provide.
In talks about a Ukrainian peace deal, much ink is spilled on attempting to interpret the actions and statements of Trump, Putin or European leaders, but very little is given to the actual agency of Ukrainians.
The NATO conundrum
Europe speaks about the need to combat Russian aggression in Ukraine today, or tomorrow Russia will attack the Baltics or another NATO country; but if European leaders truly believed that, then they would have reacted the way that they did in 1939, when Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany and entered the conflict directly. Instead, the public posturing and performative shows of “solidarity” with Ukraine appear to have been mostly motivated by their domestic politics, and from the recent results of elections, the European public is sick of “the Ukraine show.” While Europe may be instrumental in providing weapons and intelligence to the Ukrainians as the US abandons Ukraine to its fate, there is no indication that Europe has the capability to fill this void in American support or the political will to stand up to Russia.
Ukraine has become increasingly frustrated at the inability to gain a security guarantee from the Americans. This was on display at the NATO summit in summer 2023 when Zelensky unsuccessfully pressured Biden to provide a pathway to NATO for Ukraine. When it became increasingly clear that NATO leaders were not going to provide this, Zelensky sought bilateral security assurances, potentially modeled on those that the US provides to Israel outside of NATO, but again the United States refused to commit to this under a friendlier previous administration.
The Ukrainians cannot be blamed for wanting to join NATO, its Article 5 provisions call for collective defense in the vein of the Three Musketeers (“all for one, one for all”), but have never been seriously tested. As a younger man, I mocked the spectacle of the US bullying its NATO allies from the Baltics and other smaller countries to support its unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to give them a luster of multilateral credibility through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – this included Ukraine which sent forces to support America in both countries, though outside of NATO. But Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 seemed to breathe new life into NATO and remind the world of its relevance.
For Russia, the old, debunked, but now popular narrative that the US “violated” unwritten “assurances” between US President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe provides a compelling “stabbed in the back” argument for why their war of aggression is one of defense. The Americans took advantage of a moment of Russian weakness “when they were on their knees” in the 1990s, to “impose” NATO expansion that Russia never would have tolerated. This imperial logic has made its way into the American mainstream from the likes of podcasters to Fox News pundits; it frames Russia’s aggression as a logical and understandable reaction to being “backed into a corner.” This argument is the logical equivalent of a domestic abuser saying he beat his spouse because they were going to get a restraining order. Actions to address the legitimate fear of past abuse become the justification for future abuse.
But if Russia’s war in Ukraine could have been avoided if the Ukrainians and the Americans hadn’t insisted on expanding NATO closer to Russia’s borders, then why did they not react in the summer of 2024 when both Sweden and Finland joined NATO? The Finnish border with Russia is actually longer than the Ukrainian border (1,340 km compared to 1,226 km). If this war was to prevent “NATO expansion,” shouldn’t this have triggered “World War III”?
One very disturbing question is whether security guarantees to defend other NATO countries would actually be honored.
But returning to the NATO hopefuls, we have seen the sad spectacle of the US bargaining Ukraine down from demanding NATO membership, then a bilateral security guarantee, to an unbalanced and punitive extraction business deal that has now collapsed. But we should stop and ask ourselves at this point, is NATO membership the actual deterrent that would stop Russian aggression? Clearly, neither the Europeans nor the Americans have the political will to defend Ukraine, but a more disturbing question is whether security guarantees to defend other NATO countries would actually be honored. Article 5 of the NATO treaty enables collective defense, but it does not require it. This is still a political decision that is made by the most powerful states, and any hesitation or lack of coordination would have a chilling effect on collective security. In other words: the NATO treaty, much like law, scripture or paper currency has power and value as long as people recognize it as such. If the first few weeks of this administration are any indication of future US foreign policy, Europe will most likely be responsible for its own security, regardless of any treaty provisions. America has a long history of abandoning allies when they are no longer useful – ask the Kurds, Afghans or South Vietnamese.
In the ongoing talks about a Ukrainian peace deal, much ink is spilled on attempting to interpret the actions and statements of Trump, Putin or European leaders, but very little is given to the actual agency of Ukrainians. As Trump said to Zelensky in their meeting, “you don’t have a lot of cards to play.” In the Western imagination, Ukraine hangs on by a thread thanks to the West’s beneficence and magnanimity. The bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people is an afterthought. The reality is more complicated. While Ukraine has benefited substantially from American and Western military and financial assistance, it is important to remember that the Ukrainians fought from 2014-2022 with nearly no assistance from the outside. Similarly, the most strategically important and decisive victories of 2022 – including repelling the initial Russian invasion of Kyiv and the Kharkiv and Kherson counter-offensives – were won by the Ukrainians largely before the arrival of the majority of military assistance.
What is too often lost in the discussion about Ukraine is the actual role of Ukrainians and their hopes and aspirations for the future. Putting aside the morality of signing a bad deal for Ukraine (one that concedes territory and conditions to Russia without any security guarantees from outside), Western commentators assume that Zelensky will be able to sell just “any” deal to a war-weary Ukrainian public. JD Vance brought up Ukraine’s manpower and conscription issues, which are real and important. But, while Ukraine’s 900,000-man army may be tired and at times cynical, this does not mean that they will accept a deal that makes their bloodshed and their three-year long sacrifice in vain. Even the master of deals would struggle to sell the recent ceasefire terms to the same public as anything other than a humiliating defeat. Kremlin talking points that “Ukraine (or previously America or Europe) wants to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian” can now be heard throughout the halls of power in Western capitals, but this presumes that Ukrainians do not want to fight for themselves. The country is extremely fatigued after three years of total war, but they understand the risks of living under Russian occupation – and the experience of the Budapest Memorandum, Minsk 1, and Minsk 2 provides ample warning to a public used to dealing with Russia’s diplomatic treachery.
While the diplomatic fallout continues from the spectacle of Friday’s meeting, the future is still uncertain. Ukraine seems no closer to victory or stability, but is also not at a breaking point where the front line is collapsing. The Americans have prepared the pretext for abandoning Ukraine, and the Europeans appear to be prepared to provide little else other than words of support. Ukraine may be forced to continue to fight on its own for several more months, in which case we could see some movement in the front lines, or a continuation of the slow grinding slog that we have witnessed since late 2023, where Russia advances several hundred meters at the cost of countless men.
Zelensky must balance his choices and options on the international stage (if he truly has any) with his domestic realities – including the pressure from the army and public for a deal that provides something. In the end, the war will likely be resolved with a whimper and not a bang. Rather than another assault on Kyiv, Russia would be perfectly happy to impose an unpopular peace on Ukraine, sow discord amongst the public, and install its puppet as it has attempted to do in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia through electoral engineering. Ukraine and its supporters should prepare for the coming information and political battle as the military conflict culminates. Ukraine will need all the help that it can get in an uncertain world, but in the end, Ukraine’s future will come down to the quintessential Ukrainian trait of самопоміч (“sampomich” or self-reliance).
You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter
