OPINION: Syria Shows That Putin Is in Deep, Worldwide Trouble

With huge Russian losses in Syria, culminating in Assad’s flight to Russia, the world takes stock. The big unknown is the true ideological inclination of the newly empowered rebel movement. Several powers are weakened – the Assad regime was destroyed; Russia was humiliated; and Iran lost its logistical supply lines to its proxy, Hezbollah. Two countries made immediate gains: Israel faces a further weakened Hezbollah to its north, and Ukraine benefits from Russia’s humiliation. All the world sees more clearly that Russia's military and Iran are overstretched. 

However much some may revel in Assad’s flight to Russia, the serious instabilities and unintended consequences are palpable. Nobody can be sure of the full consequences, but we can make educated guesses. Iran and Russia’s immediate responses must be of three types: shock, fear, and damage control. ISIS sees opportunity, to which the US and Israel are responding with pre-emptive strikes to destroy weapons depots and production sites that could otherwise fall to ISIS.

The damage for Iran and Russia runs deep. Here, I explore possible consequences for Russia, beyond the clarity that Emperor Putin has no clothes. Let’s look to where Russia already has weaknesses and how humiliation and tangible military loss in Syria may further manifest.

The Kremlin obviously must know that its military is overstretched, an awareness already revealed in the invitation to North Korea to send troops. Assad’s failure was rooted in the Russian military’s hollowing out in Syria as well as in popular discontent.

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How will Russian forces react in Ukraine?

There may be no immediate change on the front lines, but the steady erosion over nearly three years of war and now events in Syria have shredded the imagined Russian invincibility. A rapid collapse of some Russian-held sectors of the front lines could occur, but other impacts further afield are even more likely.

A chain reaction of Russian withdrawals are likely, including of Wagner in Africa. Wagner has experienced recent defeats in Africa, in part connected to covert Ukrainian operations. While Ukraine has taken heat for its actions, the heat has come primarily from Russia-aligned countries. Russian forces abroad already were on the back foot before Syria collapsed. Domestic African political pressure and insurgent pressure will mount on remaining Russian forces. A full Russian withdrawal is almost a fait accompli, because Africa is the only place where Russia can draw many well-trained and equipped troops of its own. Western powers should prepare contingency plans.

The situation in the “Stans”

The biggest consequences of Putin’s Syria debacle may be in the former Soviet and now independent “Stans”: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. The independent governments, seeing Putin’s weakness, are more likely to insist that Russia is not their master. Russia has no spare conventional army and air power to punish divorced pieces of the former Soviet empire. Some – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan especially – have terrain that would be unforgiving to invading Russians, if any can be scraped together from an already dis-enthused domestic Russian population. 

The Central Asian countries together comprise 70 million people, nearly twice that of Ukraine, and a land area six times bigger than Ukraine. While the Central Asian armies are poorly equipped and their air forces are derelict, the same was true of Ukraine’s armed forces before Russia’s aggressions.

Though Russia has overall friendly governments in the former Soviet countries,  the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to the region in 2023 and talks with leaders underscored that not all is harmonious between Russia and those governments. There is a hint of Central Asian sympathy for Ukraine and a refusal to support Russia’s war. If the governments do not raise pressure against Russian domination in Central Asia in the face of Russia’s displayed weakness, then former and existing insurgencies likely will, from a differing perspective.

Might Tajikistan, for instance, see a revival of its 1990s civil war, which ended with the Moscow Protocol? The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) also was in armed rebellion in the 1990s.

Low-level conflicts periodically erupt across the former nations. For example, protests over high gas prices led to widespread protests in Kazakhstan in 2022, the response to which was the provision of a small number of Russian troops under the banner of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). The Russian forces were, at the time, minimized as a mere spectacle. 

Would Putin, today, order its forces to quell protests or an insurgency in a former Soviet, independent “Stan” today? Using what forces? Many people in those countries must share my doubts. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not even CSTO members.

And what about China?

President Xi cannot be impressed by Putin’s performance. He must wonder about the stability of the bordering regimes in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. The al Qaeda-linked IMU and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) are considered by Russia, China, the US, and the UN as terrorist groups. ETIM was founded by a Uighur. China used the then-minor threat of those groups to clamp down indiscriminately on its Turkic Uighur minority in western China.

It seems inevitable that the Central Asian “Stans” will either migrate away from Russian dominion either by government policy or by insurgent pressure. Russia is paralyzed by Ukraine. China will see a threat if Central Asian governments do not take command of their security or do so with striking independence.

Putin’s woes may also enflame the Russian hinterlands. Some former Soviet “Stans” are still a part of the Russian Federation. There could be a flare-up of jihadist Islamic or nationalist insurgencies inside Russia, in Chechnya and Dagestan, for example.

Geopolitical outcomes will depend on how independent former Soviet Republics and disaffected domestic Russian demographic groups respond to Putin’s weaknesses.

For Ukraine, events are unfolding favorably in some regards: Putin is revealed as a weakling. Global Chaos Theory has two measures of trouble in one hand, and a measure of hope in the other. The next few months will be wild. The global geopolitical map of national boundaries, military lines of control, and alliances may soon look very different. December 2025 will not look like December 2024.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.