OPINION: ‘On Remembering the Athenians’ in the Present Age

In recent times, an increasing number of Washington DC denizens hoping to justify the Trump Administration’s apparent embrace of Vladimir Putin and his “version of the Russo-Ukrainian War” have turned to the “realist theories” of international relations student John Mearsheimer – notions ostensibly culled from the ancient Athenian chronicler Thucydides and his “History of the Peloponnesian War,” though colored in the hues of a darker amoral “life in its natural condition is nasty, brutish and short” paradigm of human relations first formulated by English political theorist Thomas Hobbes.

According to Mearsheimer’s take on Thucydides (done through the observed Hobbesian prism), “states – especially great powers – are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them.” In other words, there is nothing to provide them with security at the international level. “This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power. The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony (at the very least).”

Given that frame of reference, Mearsheimer could and indeed has “justified” Putin’s actions. For him, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 was simply part of its attempt at regional hegemony. And Putin’s full-scale invasion in 2022 was needed to keep the large rump of Ukraine that was left over from fully heading west – i.e., joining NATO; such a move by Ukraine would strip Putin and his Russia of the security zone that it required to remain the “great power” that it was.

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Over time, Mearsheimer’s “Thucydidean” argument has come to be repeated in academia, mass media, social media and lately, as mentioned, at the highest levels of US government.

The poor ancient historian has ended up as a poster boy for what amounts to an amoral view of the world where “might makes right.” And where the goal is always to be recognized as “great.”

From this quarter, there is another Thucydides waiting to be used with regard to the Russo-Ukrainian War, especially in the aftermath of the events of last week known as the Oval Office Showdown. That version of Thucydides sees the author of the “History of the Peloponnesian War” writing what amounts to a “morality play” done with flair of a great Greek tragedy. It teaches a vivid lesson in “collective hubris” and its consequences – one that the folks in Washington and Americans generally ought to learn.

Please remember that Thucydides starts his penetrating narrative with a wonderful speech about “Athenian Exceptionalism” by the leader of the fabled city-state, Pericles, at the cusp of a 30-year conflict between Athens and three rather nasty powers in the Greek World: the militarist Sparta, oligarchic Corinth and traitorous Thebes (which sided with the Persians in the “previous big conflict”). His Theme: Athens will triumph over any adversary because of its great navies, well-honed armies, its powerful alliances (the Delian League and a pact with Argos), and its great wealth – all attained because it has the finest political system in the world, democracy, “where every man is a master of his home.”

As the narrative progresses, the wheels on the Periclean vision begin to come off, slowly at first, but eventually in rapid succession. A deserved acknowledgement of Athens’ exceptionalism begins to fray as members of the Delian League begin to perceive “arrogance”; Athens begins to take on the characteristic of a “democratic empire” (a contradiction in terms). Eventually, the embattled city state uses “imperial methods” to deal with those that don’t side with it: note Melos and Mytilene! Worse yet, it begins to justify its actions with the argument: “the powerful can do what they can, the weak must do what they must.”

Arrogance abroad has its impact internally. The Athenian population becomes jaded and begins to select “populist demagogues” as leaders. Note both Alcibiades and Cleon. Athens embarks on expeditions “to nowhere,” like the Syracuse excursion that the demagogues clamor for, and hence, with its weakened forces, neglects to help its most powerful ally Argos before and during that city-state’s battle with “the bad boys” at Mantinea. Near the end, it starts threatening members of the Delian League (think the Danes in NATO) as they peel away in despair. And Athenian “democracy” at home turns into a battle between and among oligarchic clans and populist groupings.

That eventually leaves Athens defenseless against the combined forces of Sparta, Corinth and Thebes in 404 BC. After losing a final naval battle right in its home waters, it is forced to surrender and tear down the famed walls of “Fortress Athens” – a heartbreak chronicled by another great Athenian historian, Xenophon.

If this quarter were to suggest one lesson that the Americans ought to absorb from Thucydides’ work, it would be to memorize three words of advice borrowed from a third great Athenian historian, Herodotus, operating in a very different context. In his “Persian Wars,” Herodotus has the Persian Emperor Darius, after seeing his armies routed by the upstart Athenians, tell his servant to repeat to him three times a day: Remember the Athenians!

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.