We Are Giving Russia Too Much Importance

For years, Western public opinion has explained political, social and other events related to the Central and Eastern European region and Russia without considering local realities, perspectives or contexts. To be precise, the countries of “Old Europe” and the Anglo-Saxon world ignored the voices of those nations that had empirically experienced the Russian neighborhood and the nature of Moscow. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine became a catalyst in the discussion about so-called “eastsplaining.”

Kyiv Post discusses this, as well as the difference in perception between Western European countries and the so-called Eastern flank, and Moscow’s cognitive actions towards the West, with Agnieszka Bryc, PhD, from Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland.

Michał Kujawski: Why are the countries of the CEE region in no need of explanations about what Eastern Europe is?

Agnieszka Bryc: We know it better because, unlike Western Europe, we don’t romanticize the image of Russia. We’re not dazzled by the Bolshoi Theater, Dostoevsky or Tchaikovsky. Also we’re not under the illusion that Russian emigration, whether White in the past or liberal today, does anything but obscure this image. Their liberalism and opposition end when asked: whose is Crimea, or when one refuses to speak Russian. We’re simply that group of states and nations that have shed blood in the fight against Moscow’s imperial aggression and have had our identity threatened by Great Russian chauvinism. We understand perfectly the true meaning of the words spoken by leaders in the Kremlin. We know there is no such thing as partnership with Russia; there is only clientelism. For Russia, politics is a zero-sum game, a kind of Leninist “who-whom?” Moscow doesn’t negotiate – it always fights because diplomacy is merely another tool to bring it closer to victory. Peace, for Russia, is just a pause before the next confrontation, escalation, or war. This is obvious to us, but for Western European countries, it is a painful process of waking up.

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Western countries have a different perception due to their different experiences. They are located farther from Russia.

Indeed, geographical distance seems to mitigate the discomfort of difficult neighbors, but in reality, it only obscures the picture. This was demonstrated by the United Kingdom, which for years underestimated the Russian threat. It ended up with Londongrad, political elites corrupted by Russian oligarchs, the Litvinenko murder, and the Skripal poisoning right under the noses of Her Majesty’s services, as well as Russian meddling in the Brexit referendum. The positive aspect is that today London is at the forefront of NATO countries actively trying to counter Russian aggression. In the case of France, this process took even longer. From Paris, we heard statements like “Russia is a nuclear power” or “we need to look beyond the horizon,” and only after Russian actions in Africa affected French interests did President Macron’s policy become more hawkish.

France’s interests are not only European but also Pacific.

That’s why we should understand how important it is to counter Russia by depriving it of allies or drawing away those who are “still sitting on the fence.” In my view, they will step down once it becomes clear that Russia is weaker than it appears. And this is essentially a matter of greater diplomatic activity – not just Ukrainian, but Western collectively. Look at it – Russia is a country with colonialism embedded in its imperial DNA. We need to consolidate efforts in the Global South and dismantle the myth that it uses to deceive partners in Africa or the Middle East. This doesn’t have to be done by Paris or London, it could be done by Warsaw or Prague, for example. Next – BRICS. The Russians present themselves as the leaders of this group and BRICS itself as an alternative to the West. However, the facts are that this is a double lie. In BRICS, it is not Russia that plays the leading role but China, and it is not a new G7, but so far just a shell with very aggressive PR.

Finally, we can bring Russia’s image back to reality by debunking the myth of the Kremlin’s global influence. It tries to project the image of a great power with which other powers must reckon. In reality, Russia is like Spain, but with nuclear weapons and an overinflated sense of ambition. Since it has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine, it has been forced to become dependent on China. By its own choice, it has ceased to be the East of Europe and has become the North of Asia. So why do we still attach such enormous significance to it?

We should advocate the principle that we do not talk “with” Russia, but “about” Russia with its sponsors, namely China and India. I am convinced that if we overcome the voices of big European business that still awaits a return to business as usual with Russia and maintain consistency – meaning not succumbing to “pugalki” (scare tactics) or intimidation with potential disasters that could follow if Russia falls into Chinese hands – Moscow will correct itself and show readiness for concessions.

Are you sure? When the full-scale invasion began, searching for openly pro-Russian voices in Poland or the Baltic states was like looking for a needle in a haystack. After more than two years, we can see pro-Russian or skeptical political groups or journalists regarding aid to Ukraine. If, as a society, we understand Russia well, what makes such voices appear?

In general, Poles are aware of the Russian threat and in this sense, simple pro-Russian propaganda doesn’t work on us. Unlike slogans that at first glance seem merely anti-EU or anti-Ukrainian, in reality, they are fueled by Russians as part of cognitive warfare and are meant to mask their pro-Russian nature. Therefore, in Poland, we have few pro-Russian groups. The first, necessarily small, consists of those who openly call for cooperation with Russia, such as Leszek Sykulski and his associates. The second group includes alt-right, populist, and neo-Endek circles under the Confederation party banner with their propaganda organ being Myśl Polska (banned Polish nationalist media outlet). Here, under the guise of national and patriotic slogans, they promote Dugin’s ideas, including the notion that Russia is the katechon, a force of good that will save Western civilization from depravity, leftism, and corrupt liberals. They also incite against Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees in Poland, propagate the slogan “stop Ukrainianization,” and use Kremlin propaganda language when referring to Poland – calling it a “stooge of the Yanks” or “lackey of the Anglo-Saxons.”

What is the scale of this phenomenon in Poland?

It might seem small. In reality, it’s hard to estimate. But three factors are key here. First, the eight years of the United Right government, which was only replaced by the Civic Coalition in October 2023. Law and Justice (PiS) shared a Trumpist worldview, viewing the European Union as a foreign entity, which led to its rapprochement with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. In ideological terms, PiS also had much in common with Russian conservatism. Liberalism was seen as a civilizational threat, and Germany was considered a greater problem for PiS than Russia. It was only the full-scale aggression against Ukraine and the very spontaneous reaction of Poles, who opened their hearts and homes to Ukrainians fleeing the Russian aggressor, that led PiS to follow its citizens

Another factor is strong polarization. Both camps accuse each other of being Kremlin agents, which gains them ad hoc advantages but harms the state. Popular in Poland, the term “footwrap” has become so overused that it no longer makes much of an impression. Meanwhile, the case of Pablo Gonzalez, actually Pavel Rubtsov, whom Poland handed over in the recent prisoner exchange between Russia and the West, highlighted how serious the problem of Russian intelligence activity in Poland is. The question arises: how many such Rubtsovs are still operating, infiltrating opinion-forming and journalistic circles, and skillfully driving a wedge between allies – Poland and Ukraine – and discouraging support for the West?

And finally, the third factor is the routinization of the war. After the initial wave of empathy and the honeymoon period, Poles have moved to a phase of realizing the situation. The awareness of the Russian threat remains, but many domestic political events have absorbed public attention, along with the ongoing cognitive warfare campaigns from Russia, which daily saturate social media with hostility towards Ukrainians. This is also the time when we have shifted into a long march mode. This means we have moved from a romantic surge to the tedious fight of everyday life. In this context, it involves constant vigilance to ensure that the consolidation around Ukraine does not weaken.

This is part 1 of 2.