Eleven years is enough time to look back at events without emotion and draw conclusions. The Revolution of Dignity defined Ukraine’s path, but could history have taken a different course? If the protests of 2014 had failed and the authorities had solidified their power, what would Ukraine look like today?
Let’s consider examples of countries with experiences similar to Ukraine’s. Over the years, Belarus, Georgia, and Russia have each chosen their own paths of development, yet these trajectories have led to similar outcomes: restrictions on civil liberties, intensified repression, and significant economic and demographic losses. Drawing on these examples, we will attempt to model an alternative scenario for Ukraine’s development without the Euromaidan, analyzing key aspects such as political life, social changes, economic development, and cultural processes.
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Politics
Even before the protests erupted on Independence Square, then-President Viktor Yanukovych faced criticism for his autocratic style of governance. The abandonment of the European course was more of a final straw than the root cause.
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Trembita ‘People’s Missile’ Drone Makes First Public Appearance
Systematic pressure on businesses and the media, the concentration of power, and political repression – including the 2011 arrest of then-opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko for abuse of office and the 2010 arrest of former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko on similar charges – all gradually paved the way to the events of 2014.
At the EU’s request, Lutsenko was later pardoned and was already present at the Maidan, as Independence Square is called, when the Revolution of Dignity began. Tymoshenko was released immediately after it became known that Yanukovych had fled the country, while protesters still remained on the square. To understand how events might have unfolded under alternative circumstances, one need only look at Belarus.
After the 2020 protests, which Alexander Lukashenko managed to suppress, the country witnessed a true “witch hunt.” Leaders of the opposition, Sergei Tikhanovsky and Viktar Babarika, were arrested ahead of the elections, while another presidential candidate, Valery Tsepkalo, fled the country.
Security services conducted searches and summoned anyone suspected of supporting the protests for interrogation at detention centers. The courts merged the cases of protest participants with those who covered the events, delivering collective sentences.
Today, Lukashenko continues to label protest participants as terrorists and refers to the events in Belarus as acts of extremism.
The situation for the Russian opposition has rarely, if ever, been easy.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Boris Berezovsky paid a high price for their attempts to challenge Putin’s power. However, the Russian president definitively crossed the line in 2015, when opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was shot in the back near the Kremlin. Although the murder has never been directly linked to Putin, Russian society was deeply shaken by the tragedy, fueling a desire for change in the 2018 elections.
The 2018 elections were accompanied by mass protests under the slogan “He is not our Tsar,” led by the new opposition figure Alexei Navalny. Many public figures joined the demonstrations, and opposition media widely covered the growing discontent with the ruling regime.
Nevertheless, Putin managed to crush the protests: 1,600 people were detained, including Navalny himself. Opposition media outlets were branded as extremist or foreign agents.
Two years later, Navalny was poisoned with Novichok – a nerve agent frequently used by Russian security services. This time, he was saved: the opposition leader was flown to Germany for treatment, where he managed to recover. However, despite advice from European leaders, Navalny returned to Russia, where he was immediately arrested. Later, Navalny died in Penal Colony No. 3.
Georgia has also resorted to imprisoning political opponents.
In 2021, former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili was arrested for illegally crossing the border and abusing power during his presidency.
Saakashvili had secretly returned to Georgia ahead of local elections and remains in custody to this day.
Reflecting on the past 11 years, one could assume that if the 2014 protests had been crushed, political pressure on the opposition would have only intensified, with Yanukovych launching a witch hunt against all those connected to the Maidan.
It is also highly likely that by 2025, Yanukovych could have secured a fourth term as Ukraine’s leader or remained in power by backing pro-Russian candidates like Viktor Medvedchuk or Yuriy Boyko.
Culture
The 2014 protests initiated Ukraine’s path toward European integration, but an equally significant outcome was the renaissance of Ukrainian culture. A series of important laws were passed, promoting the growth of Ukrainian-language content. Quotas on radio and television paved the way for young, emerging artists. For the first time in many years, substantial funding was allocated to the production of Ukrainian films.
Would this have been possible without the Revolution of Dignity? Unlikely. And here’s why.
In 2019, Belarus allocated 543 million rubles ($168 million today) to culture and sports, but by 2023, this amount had dwindled to 182 million ($56 million). While this can partly be attributed to economic decline, there are other reasons as well. Artists in Belarus face systematic persecution, and independent media outlets are labeled as extremist.
Following the 2020 protests, outlets such as Belsat and Radio Liberty were declared extremist, with their platforms blocked within Belarus. Artists who supported the protests face immense pressure. For instance, comedian Slava Komissarenko, known for his outspoken criticism of Lukashenko, was sentenced in absentia to six years in prison.
Slava Komissarenko. Photo: Instagram
A similar situation unfolded in Russia. In 2012, the State Duma passed the “foreign agents” law – anyone receiving foreign funding or deemed to be under “foreign influence” could be labeled as a “foreign agent.” This designation imposed severe restrictions and, in some cases, led to a complete ban on activities.
For instance, Russia banned the Dozhd TV channel, the independent outlet Meduza, blogger Yury Dud, and musician Morgenshtern. Many artists and cultural figures faced political pressure.
As early as 2008, Russia established Roskomnadzor, which effectively became an instrument of censorship and repression. If officials disapprove of an artist, their concerts can be canceled – as happened with Noize MC, who openly supports Ukraine. Alternatively, an artist can simply be “erased” from the public sphere. Director Alexander Sokurov, for example, is highly respected in Europe, but in Russia, he is neither invited to award ceremonies nor provided with funding for his films due to his opposition views.
Georgia has also grappled with censorship of artists supporting the opposition. However, the most significant blow to Georgian culture came with the 2023 attempt to pass a law similar to Russia’s “foreign agents” legislation. This sparked mass protests across the country and strained relations with Brussels.
Thus, if protests in Ukraine had been suppressed, we might have witnessed:• Increased pressure on independent media,• The adoption of a “foreign agents” law as a tool of repression,• The growing influence of Russian culture.
Without radio and TV quotas, artists like Latexfauna, Jerry Heil, and Artem Pivovarov might never have emerged. Their places would likely have been taken by Russian performers such as Timati, Buzova, and Kirkorov.
Even with quotas in place, Russian artists continued to dominate Ukrainian airwaves for a long time, headlining major music festivals and performing concerts in Ukraine.
Russian band LSP performing at Atlas Weekend 2021. Photo: YouTube
Given Putin’s recent statements regarding Ukraine, it is also highly likely that the Russian language could have been granted official status as a second state language, further increasing Russia’s influence on Ukrainian education and culture.
Economy
The economies of Yanukovych-era Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia share several commonalities – vassal-like dependence on Russia, extractive institutions, and being labeled as high-risk by Western investors.
In 2013, over 30% of Ukraine’s imports and exports were tied to Russia, a situation that persists in Belarus to this day. Georgia’s position is slightly better, but Russia remains the country’s largest energy supplier and the second-largest importer of Georgian goods after China.
All three countries have been heavily reliant on Russian energy. Preferential prices for gas, oil, and coal could at any moment turn into exploitative terms or, in times of strained relations with Moscow, trigger an energy crisis. Russia has frequently used and continues to use this mechanism to influence the political landscape of these countries.
Another shared feature of their economies is the presence of extractive institutions: a privileged minority exploits resources to maintain its own wealth. During Yanukovych’s presidency, he was often criticized for corruption and systemic pressure on businesses.
As Ukraine drew closer to Moscow, Russian businesses expanded their influence: Sberbank, Lukoil, MTS, and Yandex actively penetrated the Ukrainian market.
Another factor is the reluctance of large Western companies to invest in these economies due to the risk of expanding sanctions, high levels of corruption, and undemocratic regimes.
Without the courage of the Ukrainian people in 2014, we might never have known brands like Monobank or Nova Poshta, and companies such as IKEA and H&M might never have entered the Ukrainian market.
Instead, Ukraine’s economy would have been quietly annexed by Russian businesses: cities would be filled with Tinkoff Bank signs, Gazprom gas stations, and Magnit or Pyaterochka supermarkets.
Social policy
According to the Institute of Demography, as of early 2025, around 36 million Ukrainians reside in Ukraine, with only 31 million living in territories controlled by Ukraine. Similar data is cited by the UN, which notes that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s population has decreased by 10 million, leaving just over 31 million. Undoubtedly, this decline is directly linked to the war: irreversible losses, an increase in refugees, and a drop in birth rates.
However, it would be premature to claim that if the Revolution of Dignity had been suppressed, Ukraine would have avoided a similar demographic crisis.
In 2023, Georgia’s population decreased by 1.1%, a decline attributed to the protests against the foreign agents law. In 2025, the Georgian government plans to conduct its first population census in 11 years, as the extent of the population decline following the 2024 protests remains unknown.
After the events of 2020, Belarus saw its population shrink by nearly 2% within a year, according to data from Ukrainian and Polish border services. Belarusian civic activist Sergey Burda stated that since the suppression of protests, between 700,000 and 1 million citizens – around 10% of the population – have left the country over the past five years.
Based on this information, one could conclude that under the best circumstances, Ukraine would have been losing about 1% of its population annually, resulting in a population of just over 36 million by early 2025. However, under worse conditions, where migration due to increasing repression, political, and economic pressure reached around 2% per year, Ukraine’s population would barely exceed 32 million.
It is also highly likely that Ukraine would have experienced a brain drain similar to Russia and Belarus. Young professionals – engineers, scientists, doctors, IT specialists, and entrepreneurs – would have been the first to leave the country.
Ukraine as Russia’s “Outpost” in Europe
George Friedman, author of “The Next 100 Years,” wrote that with Yanukovych’s election in 2010, the idea of the Orange Revolution had faded, seemingly marking the end of Ukraine’s path to the European Union.
He speculated then that within a few years, Ukraine would fall entirely under Russian influence, with joint Ukrainian-Russian military exercises being conducted along the borders with Poland and Moldova, demanding neutral status for the Baltics and a reduction in the Alliance’s military presence in Eastern Europe.
Friedman’s predictions appear eerily accurate, with one exception: Ukraine’s path to the European Union was only just beginning with Yanukovych’s election. The participants of the Revolution of Dignity showed the world exactly who Ukrainians refuse to be.
Today, Ukraine pays an unbearable price for its desire for freedom and the right to self-determination. Despite this, the past 11 years and the experience of countries that once chose a different path offer a clear understanding that everyone who took to the streets of Independence Square on Nov. 21, 2013, made no mistake in their decision.
Today, Ukraine fights for its freedom and identity, not for the cult of “victory.” Ukraine builds its own international companies rather than falling deeper into debt over Russian energy resources. Ukraine revives its own traditions, history, and culture, instead of becoming a pale shadow of the Russian Empire.
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