Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin notably questioned the Kremlin's articulated theory of victory and assessed that 2025 and possibly late 2024 will be “a serious test” for Russia because the Kremlin has yet to address medium- to long-term force-generation and defense-industrial-capacity constraints.

Girkin published a series of letters from prison written between September 28 and October 12 in which he argued that the Kremlin’s current strategy depends on the outcome of the US presidential elections, implying that the Kremlin anticipates that Russia will be able to outlast Western support for Ukraine based on the policies of a new US administration.

 Girkin acknowledged that he does not have access to reliable tactical forecasts due to his imprisonment but noted that the Kremlin has yet to fix its systematic defense industrial base (DIB) and manpower problems since launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that these problems may soon lead to military-economic crises in Russia.

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Girkin claimed that the Kremlin has exaggerated its military capabilities, resulting in the Russian DIB failing to catch up to war-time equipment needs. He emphasized that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has long “consumed” or “is finishing” remaining Russian weapon reserves.

Girkin also noted that Russia has expended trained personnel as if they are “endless and inexhaustible,” and that the war has already “eaten up" Russian professional forces. he implied that subsequent Russian force generation efforts are detrimental to the Russian economy because the Kremlin now needs to generate forces from its labor force.

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Girkin argued that the Kremlin’s lack of long-term strategic planning and poor tactical planning created conditions in which the Russian military and DIB systems respond to emerging problems only after these problems become “critically dangerous.”

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The imprisoned nationalist critic of Putin notably claimed that the Kremlin has wasted the time it has had to correct these “gross mistakes,” noting that the Kremlin missed the opportunity that the West and Ukraine “kindly provided” to Russia “via their own incompetence and degradation” by delaying the provision of US aid to Ukraine in Winter 2023–2024 and Spring 2024.

Girkin routinely pointed out Russia's long-term military and political vulnerabilities prior to his arrest in July 2023. He is also notably one of the first voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space to openly question the Kremlin's theory of victory.

Girkin also assessed that the Russian Summer–Fall 2024 offensive campaign did not accomplish its goals in the entire theater and is unlikely to do so ahead of the muddy season, although Russian forces are continuing intense offensive operations in several operational directions in Ukraine.

Girkin stated that the Russian offensive operation north and northeast of Kharkiv City has “stalled” with very insignificant territorial advances; that Russian offensives in Donetsk Oblast merely “pushed” Ukrainian positions but did not break through the frontline; and that Russian forces are spending their reserves on repelling Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. Girkin argued that the Russian seizure of Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast was “unsurprising” because Russian forces once again failed to encircle Ukrainian forces, which are now able to consolidate on a shortened frontline to the northwest of the settlement.

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Girkin assessed that the Ukrainian Summer–Fall 2024 defensive operation was successful in achieving its goals of repelling Russian offensives with minimal territorial losses; delivering strong counterattacks; preserving unused reserves; and maintaining morale within the military and society.

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